CYPRUS: FROM CRISES TO SOLUTIONS

**Virtual Symposium
by
the Department of International Relations, Ege University**

**Editors
Assoc. Prof. Feride Aslı ERGÜL JORGENSEN
Res. Assist. Oktay DAYIOĞLU
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İZMİR - 2022

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

This book is a transcription of an online symposium titled "Cyprus: From Crises to Solutions", organized by the Department of International Relations at Ege University on December 4, 2021. The publication of this symposium, in which six academics from Turkey and Greece came together to discuss many different national and international problems from politics to law, from sociology to economics, from environmental problems to gender issues, and to ponder possible solutions regarding Cypriot issues, aims at reaching wider audiences. We believe it will be beneficial for our readers. The topics covered during both the presentations and the Q&A part, which last approximately 5 hours, will be interesting and enlightening not only for International Relations and Political Science students, but also for anyone interested in the subject.

Before going on to outline the contents of the book, we would like to underline that in order not to disturb the dynamics of the symposium, we did not make big changes with the natural flow of the dialogues. In this context, it should also not be forgotten that this book may have some shortcomings in academic citations since it is a symposium transcript. Although scientific citations were added as much as possible during the transcription stage, there may have been some naturally overlooked parts, especially in the question-and-answer sections. For this reason, we ask you to be forbearing of such shortcomings and always keep in mind that the text is a transcript of a symposium.

Concerning the contents of the symposium and thus the book, we would like to highlight the following. After the opening speeches of the symposium were made by the chair of the session Feride Aslı Ergül Jorgensen and the Head of Department Professor Siret Hürsoy, the presentations of the participants started.

In the first presentation, Effie Charalampaki outlined conceptual understandings of the Cyprus issues, at both the regional and the global level while subjecting regional problems to a theoretical analysis within the framework of the concept of "complexity". After this theoretical presentation, Dilek Latif shed light on the social trends in the island by sharing the empirical results of a study of women's approaches to the Cyprus issue in northern and southern Cyprus. Afterwards, the symposium continued with Altuğ Günal's presentation comparing the federation practices in Cyprus and Yugoslavia. Vakur Sümer, who made the next presentation, underlined that the problems on the island are not only political or social, but also environmental, and stated how critical the
decrease in water levels has become. The symposium continued with an International Relations analysis, in which Charalampos Tsardanidis evaluated

how the European Union was involved in the Cyprus problem. The presentations part of the symposium was completed with a presentation by Feride Aslı Ergül Jorgensen, who discussed the question of whether a consensus could be reached on the Cyprus issue within the framework of social identity and the awareness of being an islander.

After these six presentations, which approached the Cyprus problem from different perspectives but with a solution-oriented approach, the symposium was concluded with a lively and productive question-answer phase. This last part, which was shaped by presenters asking each other questions about their presentations and the questions that the audience asked the presenters, created an efficient platform for how solutions can be produced in a multi-layered and multi-disciplinary universe regarding solutions to the Cyprus problem.

We hope that you will enjoy reading this symposium book, where we discuss the Cyprus issue with original presentations, exchange different ideas and engaged in solution-oriented discussions.

Assoc. Prof. Feride Aslı ERGÜL JORGENSEN
Res. Assist. Oktay DAYIOĞLU
Res. Assist. Nilda ÇİÇEKLİ

SYMPOSIUM OPENNING

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Dear distinguished participants and distinguished guests welcome to our symposium: "Cyprus: From Crises to Solutions". Before moving on to the symposium program, I would like to give the floor to Prof. Siret Hürsoy, who is the head of International Relations Department at Ege University. Professor, the floor is yours.

Siret Hürsoy: Thank you very much Aslı and you all welcome to our International Relations Departmental activity. And, I think, I should be very thankful to Aslı because she was the one who is always kicking and pushing me to organize such a kind of event. I was very happy to help and to hear those plans on organizing this event today.

Let me tell from the very beginning that I was born and grew up in Cyprus. So, I'm a Turkish Cypriot for those who do not know maybe. I always yoked by the Cyprus conflict. Since I was born, Cyprus was a divided island, and the conflict is a kind of a laboratory for many fields. I mean, not just for international relations, but primarily for international relations. As I observed since my childhood, this conflict has been discussed, analyzed and explored from every aspect of the field, from Anthropology, even to Psychopolitics and from Economics to Political Science. I think, from every channel, it has been tried to resolve the conflict and it was explored. Everything is in front of us about the Cyprus conflict. Whatever you would like to talk and think and do is in front of you. What you need is to pick and choose the most convenient ones and combine them in order to reach a solution. That, of course, requires a favorable environment and kind of a will from many sides; not just from the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, but as well as from Turkey, UK, European Union, United States and Russia. Day by day, we see many other actors involving into this conflict and this makes it very complicated.

When we look from this perspective, it seems like a very much pessimistic situation, but there are many opportunities in international relations that should not be missed. I mean, we missed the opportunities like the end of the Cold War. We missed the opportunities like Kofi Annan. These were the great opportunities. We have many other opportunities that came in front of us, but we missed. Unfortunately, we should start from somewhere with a scratch. We cannot expect 100% perfection in this kind of a solution either for the Turkish side or for the Greek side. So, that should start from somewhere, right? Because each side is trying to take off guard against each other and trying to reach maximum benefit from this situation, which I think would not help in the resolution of the conflict. Nonetheless, I think, international relations always

provides us an opportunity for the future. We should not be pessimistic because IR is for the future, not for the past. So, we have to look into the future from this IR perspective and look for into the future with more optimism and as you all know, diplomacy is a kind of an art. In this art, we have spoken and written speech acts by representatives of those states in order to change the international system or to shape the international system, as well as state-to-state relations are also shaping this international system. Disagreements, conflicts, and what should not be done about the Cyprus conflict has been talked a lot in diplomacy. Everybody repeats that this is the wrong and that's the right thing, but what should be done is that how each side should behave to each other in practice.

This should be discussed more in detail from an optimistic way, rather than talking about the mistakes of each side. We have to be very much constructive, right? Hopefully, this symposium and the participants as well, will have a very clear insight on this situation from this positive perspective. We will discuss how we could proceed further and also strengthen our cooperation here with those of the participants, as well as maybe we could have an option for the future to organize a bigger event after this symposium. Because this could be a very much tentative meeting for the future collaboration between you, the guests, and those institutions. As well, we have already thought of that this meeting could be an initiation of a bigger event between us to see how we could collaborate.

Before I leave the floor to Aslı, because I'm not really a speaker here to give you a speech on the Cyprus problem, but I will do my best to get involved into the situation from the northern part of Cyprus, of course as being one of the original Turkish Cypriots. So, I would like to thank to those, particularly from the very beginning to Aslı, because she did everything in this organization by herself. Therefore, I'm very much thankful to her and thank you very much for the participants, of course, for those participants from Turkey and from Greece as well. I really became very appreciated by the participation of old friends like Charalambos. I know him from our previous meetings and I will be also very happy to get to know Effie here and Vakur as well, because I didn't know them and Altuğ is our departmental colleague. So I know him very well. Therefore, thank you very much all for participating to this event and to those of the guests. Now, they are going to listen to us and make a constructive effort in learning as well as adding something, maybe to our thoughts. That would be very much fruitful. I hope we will end up with a very much worthwhile meeting and we

will have a better collaboration in the future. Thank you very much again to guests and participants as well for coming and being with us.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you so much for your kind words and your support. Let me also say that I wasn't alone in organizing this event. Oktay Dayıoğlu and Nilda Çiçekli are really a great help through the process. I would like to thank also Effie, Charalambos, Vakur, Dilek and Altuğ for kindly accepting my request and being here. Thank you so much.

It is time to actually start the symposium, which is titled "Cypus: From crises to Solutions". It refers going from multiple crises to various solutions. We will talk about the ways for solutions. Maybe, we cannot come up with a certain formula but what is important here is the dialogue itself. We will discuss issues together; we will try to look from different perspectives. The symposium is devoted to exploring different factors that shape the regional and global complexities of Cyprus. The participants will discuss the international, political, economic, legal, social, and cultural aspects of cooperation, conflict, contending identities, energy politics, water resource management, security issues, and the emerging regional alliances. The symposium makes a priority of analyzing both conflicts and potential solutions. We are hoping to have a lively dynamic exchange of different ideas from the symposium participants and with the audience here.

Before we start the presentations, I would like to give you the short description of the symposium program. The symposium is basically divided into two successive sessions of two hours with a 10-minutes break in between. In the first session, the symposium will start with presentations of the participants, in which they will outline their general views on the subject. Afterwards, we will continue with the questions and answers of the symposium participants about each other's presentation. We try to create an active dialogue. We talk with each other and develop some multilevel aspects for grasping the issue better. At the end of this part, we will open the floor for everone, including the audience to ask their questions and discuss the topics and questions in rounds. You can also write your question. We hope to turn this second session into a roundtable format.

Please let me remind you that the symposium proceedings are now being recorded and will be transcribed into a symposium publication. I guess, after saying all this, now, I wish a fruitful and enlightening symposium for all of us and I start the symposium by Effie Charalampaki.

Let me first introduce her. Effie is the founder and the director of International Relations Theory Working Group at the Centre for Euro-Atlantic

Studies of the Institute of International Relations, which is actually known as IDIS in Athens, Greece. She's also a research member of the East Asia Research Program of IDIS. Before that she belonged to the Center for Euro Atlantic Studies at IDIS with a focus on transatlantic relations. She has worked as a research assistant for Sara McLaughlin Mitchellin in the ICOW project and for James N. Rosenau, who has specialized her in complexity theory. She has conducted undergraduate and graduate studies in the United States, notably a BS in political science and a BA in international affairs from Florida State University and MS studies at the Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at George Mason University. And, let me also say that she was an honor student and got invited to an honor society in the United States. She has worked for the Florida Department for Environmental Protection Press Office and the Greek Embassy in Washington, DC. Her research is focused on IR theory, globalization processes, transnationalism, global governance, international institutions, world order processes and regionalism, with a special focus on the Eastern Mediterranean and Japan. She has published articles and book chapters, and she is the co-editor of two forthcoming books, Complexity & Security (with co-editor Robert Lummack) and Innovation Cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Importance of Partnerships and Networks (with co-editors Dr. Kostas Ifantis and Dr. Aristotle Tziampiris). Effie, now we are looking forward to hearing your inspiring ideas. The floor is yours.

PAPER PRESENTATIONS

PRESENTATION BY EFFIE CHARALAMPAKI

Thank you very, very much. I would like to thank, first of all, Dr. Siret Hürsoy, him being as the chair of the IR Department of Ege University and of course, Dr. Aslı Jorgensen and everybody inviting me that a such distinguished line-up of scholars to present my idea. So I'm very grateful for the invitation. Thank you very much.

Before I start, Dr. Hürsoy said that we need novel approaches in order to tackle both global problems and the regional conflicts and I completely agree with him. This is something that is mandatory in this day and age, especially with the instability we are viewing in the global order and uncertainly becoming a core parameter of both the micro and macro levels of global existence. So, we have to understand that uncertainty and unpredictable situations will become the norm in the 21st century, something that we need to develop crisis management mechanisms for. We have to be ready all the time, and our policies have to be developed around this parameter in order to be feasible, effective, and actually foster the well-being of individuals and communities.

In this regard I'm coming here, and I would like to say, right from the beginning that I'm very honored by the invitation, but I have to say, I'm not actually an expert in Greek-Turkish relations. There are other scholars, who are extremely expert in this field, and I'm not an expert in the Cyprus problem, but I'm here to speak about IR theory. And from the point of view that, yes, I'm a person who strive to create novelty in the IR theory field, and I'm trying to develop the field and take it forward, and I'm saying that not in an arrogant manner, in order to create more sustainable structures, governance structures for the global order. In this regard, I'm coming here to offer a completely different approach from the traditional IR theory and the traditional streams of IR theory that offers so far, especially for conflict areas, such as regional conflict areas, such as the Cyprus issue. So, I approach conflict in general, the regional conflict in our area, in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, and this is the way I will also approach the conflict on the Cyprus Island as "wicked problems." And this is because it allows for a more holistic approach to governance, a more holistic approach to viewing systems and their parts; in this way, systems become complex adaptive systems, because this is what we mostly need in this day and era: We need strategies for adaptation and complexity management mechanism strategies.

We have areas especially in conflicts where we have high degrees of complexity and turbulence, which allow entropy to destabilize systems and their parts. And this is something that we have to have in mind in order to foster stability and create equilibrium strategies. So, by viewing conflict areas as wicked problems, we allow for supportive structures and processes to be created. This means that we don't have governance with one size fits all, and this accommodates many communities and many individuals with different views that have to tolerate each other and live with each other and prosper together. And there is a difficult tension between portfolios regarding this notion, but ultimately, we have to create holistic processes. And a holistic process is most importantly supportive of culture and skills base. And that's why I'm adopting this strategy because, here, we have a conflict where we have supposedly different cultures, but, in my view, the cultures are almost the same: The Greek Cypriot side and the Turkish Cypriot side, and they share the same culture and they have to live together in one state, manage to live together and prosper together.

Also, it [a holistic approach] facilitates information management and infrastructure. We see, many times, that in conflicts like this we have a lot of misinformation and, also, information that is being lost and this perpetuates the conflict. And, also, when it gets in policy, we have the appropriation of management and accountability frameworks. So, the most important thing is that this approach, as I said before, allows for the systems in conflict, the actors both micro and macro in conflict zones to be viewed as complex adaptive systems. And this means that they are "open" systems, they are not "closed" systems to become isolated, they are open systems, so we can have feedback loops and inputs and outputs that come inside the system and outside the system towards the regional and global order. And this allows for better management of communication actually, of negotiation processes and of fostering trust between communities that have to sit together at the same table to talk.

So, by approaching a conflict like this with not a narrow process, we allow actually for collaborative strategies to flourish. And, this is very, very important because we have many stakeholders that hold power, power many times is dispersed, and they have to get together and find a common ground in order to negotiate and talk, and also find common solutions. It is particularly relevant where part of the solution to the problem involves sustained behavioral change by manystake holders and the civil society, the citizens. At the core of collaboration is a win-win view of the problem solving, which is very important in order to actually solve the problem. This way, partnerships, joint ventures

and the "wholes" of government, international treaties, information campaigns to influence lifestyle choices and so forth become vital components of a strategy in order for a common future [to be created].

Let me give you just a small idea, what is a "wicked problem," because usually we label as "wicked problems" problems that are protracted conflicts and problems that are so complex that cannot be solved by the traditional approaches (Lummack, 2017). And, we see this with Cyprus because, actually, we have a state in the Northern part that is only recognized as far by Turkey, and with the Turkish community remaining isolated on the island and not allowing the island as a "whole" to embrace its European and international prospects. And, therefore, the island is in dire need of cooperation between the two communities, and this may require novelty, both in theory and in practice. And, unfortunately, their national institutions have not yielded positive-sum outcomes, in my view, at the resolution of the conflict so far between the two sides.

A fact that we profess to the lack of an adequate framework in IR theory to produce a creative way of systems thinking about the interactions of micro and macro level variables, such as international institutions, global and regional powers, local actors and elites, civil society and non-state actors such as hydrocarbon companies, this have become a dynamic player in Southeastern Mediterranean and, sometimes, put fire in the conflict, if I can say that [meant "add fuel to the fire"]. So, what is needed most importantly is the creation of a conceptual framework that offers a shared reality, like I said before, to both communities that transcends their personal narratives, perceptions and misperceptions of each other and develops networks of knowledge-sharing and innovation-sharing that they're connected to a broader regulatory mechanism in the region, at the regional level. If you permit me, I will say that "wicked problems" have many interdependencies and are often multi-causal, attempts to address wicked problems often lead to unforeseen consequences, and they are often problems and conflicts that cannot be tackled with stability mechanisms (Rittel, 1973). We have to take into consideration entropy, stability and turbulence as the main parameters. And, this may sound a little odd, but this is not the case in all conflicts.

So, "wicked problems" usually have no clear solution, especially we see that in protracted conflicts, and they are socially very complex, and we need to create a responsibility for any organization that is involved in this conflict to become a shareholder with a shared reality in order to tackle the problem. And the most important thing is that we have to do with agents that have

continuously changing behavior which stimulates higher degrees of entropy, and this is the most important thing that we need to tackle in order to create a viable and a sustainable solution. So, after having done this introduction, if you allow me, I'd like to share a PowerPoint presentation that I have created, to give you my view: what theory we could use; what novelty we could use at the theoretical level in order to create a new approach to cooperation on the island of Cyprus, in which shareholders can also become Greece and Turkey, the European union, other global powers that are in the area such as Russia and the United States, despite the problems [meant "despite the problems between them], and non-state actors.

So, I'm proposing the "complexity approach" which departs from the traditional IR theory and IR theoretical approaches. And why this approach: because core complexity dimensions are uncertainty and unpredictability, and this is something that we see with all conflicts, especially if we examine the history of the Cypriot problem. This is a core factor. Political and geopolitical order emerging from the interactions of micro and macro agents, and this we see it in Earnest and Rosenau article, allows for creating policy at the "micro-macro nexus": This is a theorem I have developed and, also, I have many graphs, if anybody is interested in. (Earnest and Rosenau, 2006).

A part of it is going to publish by Kadir Has [University] now, and, actually, I was much honored that I authored the chapter with Dr. Bezen Balamir. And, also, we have a forthcoming article that is hopefully being published in a journal special issue, where we're talking about these governance models based on the micro-macro nexus, which is placed at the intersection of the domestic-foreign frontier. It allows for a bottom-up approach which is what we need actually in conflicts, like the Cypriot conflict, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in order to create sustainability, which is central in conflict resolution, as authority and power structures become decentralized. The complexity approach accommodates "turbulance" regionally and at the nation-state level, and it creates what we say "emergence." So, we escape the traditional anarchical paradigm of all the "-isms" where traditional IR theory is based. And we see that "agents act on the basis of internal rules that evolve in response to regional and international feedback" (Olssen, 2015). So, anarchic implications of complexity for societies and global politics are tamed by the creation of a normative emphasis on institutionalization and regulation.

The complexity approach allows for "holism" instead of reductionist approaches, "reductionist" means a downward causation -we see how the system affects the micro components- this way you can not create a bottom up

approach for governance (Charalampaki, 2021) so that a more "systemic" approach is developed to conflict resolution and this way parts/agents and whole mutually affect each other and "emergence" is the outcome of the system as a whole, which creates a new order at the state level and at the regional level (Charalampaki, 2021). And I believe that a key component in order to tackle conflicts like the Cypriot conflict and the Palestinian Israeli conflict, and potentially other conflicts, is to view them as complex adaptive systems-parts in a broader complex adaptive system, which is the sub-system of the southeastern [I meant the Eastern Mediterranean which is more accurate] and the Middle East. So, this leads to a normative conception of authority and its institutionalization that departs from the usual narratives about "anarchy" and "catastrophe" that we see with traditional IR theory, and when complexity is left unregulated, and we see that we have high complexity where we cannot solve this protracted conflicts, it results in entropy and disorder (Charalampaki, 2021). So this creates "non-scalable distributions in social and economic world" (Olssen, 2015).

The complexity approach, therefore, allows for the creation of regulatory regional networks that, through political action, encourage innovation cooperation at the micro, meso and macro levels. And this creates ultimately an imperative of planning combined with strategic foresight for larger stakeholders, like the European Union, especially when we have security governance structures which are paramount in the Cypriot situation, that fosters management and containment of regional and national complexity, adaptation mechanisms for micro components to the macro realities and control mechanisms to tame disorder and randomness in agent interactions (Charalampaki, 2021). And, this is key in order to produce a viable "bottom-up" approach that allows for the incorporation of multi-track diplomacy strategies into conflict resolution. And the result is that political elites can manage the unexpected, the uncertainty, which is the most important parameter in the global order right now and, as a result, in regional orders. So, the complexity approach mitigates against individualism -this is key in order to solve conflict- which is the classic liberal tradition from Locke and onwards (Olssen, 2015).

Individuals are conceptualized as dependent upon other people and communities of people in the same systemic "whole" so that interdependence and interconnectedness are appreciated as vital parameters of the survival of the "whole" – [i.e.] the whole island as one whole, both communities, as part of one whole. This leads to the emergence of regional systems and national structures that encourage social support for the "opponent" as the survival of one

community depends on the survival of the other and vice versa. There are enormous implications for "an ethics of action" (Olssen 2015); and this is something that I have taken from Dr. Olssen, it is his idea which stresses "conscience, responsibility, accountability when prediction and control are elusive" (Olssen, 2015), because the micro, which are the individuals and the communities on the island, is viewed as insufficient in face of precarious and unpredictable environments, so that an institutional mechanism to regulate politics, connections and interactions at the micro level can emerge that can incorporate social justice strategies, borrowing from David Hume, that foster coordination and mutual trust (Olssen, 2015). This is actually something that we are trying to examine and research in the book that we're co-editing with Dr. Ifantis and Dr. Tziampiris right now; and we are very fortunate that Dr. Aslı Jorgensen and Dr. Knud Jørgensen are authors in this book.

So "institutionalization becomes, hence, a normative consequence of the complexity" (Olssen, 2015) that uncertainty, unpredictability and possible danger produce. And, "democracy is presented as a viable institutional mechanism for survival and well-being" (Olssen, 2015) of all parts of the same whole, so we escaped the division strategies. And, democracy and social justice become necessary this way. So, the complexity approach for cooperation: Why this approach? Because usually so far, when it comes to cooperation and fears of cooperation, we had the dominant approach to cooperation that was coming from Robert Axelrod, which is a "tit for tat" model (Axlerod, 1984). But this model promotes cooperation for "agents without any collective structures" (Olssen, 2015) in which the whole is more than the sum of its parts, which is key in complex adaptive systems. In Axelrod's model, agents interact without any institutionalized structures of cooperation and coordination which leads to zero-sum games potentially and no positive conception of political authority (Olssen, 2015; Earnest and Rosenau, 2006).

Moreover, in Axelrod's model, "prohibition on communication is overcome through repeated plays of the game" (Olssen, 2015) and this leads, as we all know, to the prisoner's dilemma, where we have rational actors that do not cooperate ultimately even if it is in their best interest to do so because only self-interest dictates behavior which leads ultimately to disinformation and non-communication. Anatol Rapaport came in order to develop Axelrod's model after Axelrod asked him to develop this model, and he said: "One begins by cooperating and then echoes opponent's moves" (Olssen, 2015).

Based on that, we have another approach by Philip Ball. He states: "If a mistake is made, players are locked into a vicious cycle of mutual

recrimination" that eventually leads to a "succession of errors" that inhibit cooperation and foster mistrust (Olssen, 2015; Ball, 2004). Hence, the traditional approach to cooperation, "tit for tat," guarantees ultimately a "hobbesian" world where strategies are not so "nice."

Therefore, for conflict resolution, it is best to create institutionalized, positive, regulatory mechanisms that encourage "bottom-up" approaches to overcome Axelrod's conception of cooperation, which is based on "Nash equilibrium which states that cooperation emerges purely through the interaction of agents" (Olssen, 2015) without a supra-communal structure of authority that coordinates the interactions of micro and macro. And this leads eventually to the "tragedy of the commons" by policy makers and cooperation based purely on rational egoists that promote only their self-interest (Olssen, 2015). Here, in conflicts like this, in protracted conflicts, we have to find a mechanism, and I know it's very difficult to transcend this process. So, the actual problem with traditional cooperation theories is that in an era of pervasive transnationalism and profound global interconnectedness and interdependence on all levels of human existence, cooperation cannot, and I emphasize that, emerge simply through the interactions between agents. Unfortunately, this is a route that the European Union is taking also many times in order to create policy and especially in its neighborhood. IR theory needs "a positive theory of institutionalization that promotes a positive role for the state" as the regulator of a "shared" reality for different communities that wish to be incorporated in the "same whole" based on an "objective [constructive] ethic" that links the global, regional, national and social levels, as Mark Olssen stresses in his chapter that was published in 2015 in Kavalski's book (Olssen, 139-166).

So, complexity science is a remedy for theories of cooperation and why I'm using this approach?

[1] It allows for the creation of "intermediary institutions" (Olssen, 2015) that link governance structures at the micro, meso, regional and macro level, very important especially for security governance in conflict areas.

[2] The creation of a "shared reality" based on "objective ethic," according to Mark Olssen, based on a "shared conception" of justice and democracy (Olssen, 2015).

[3] The creation of a system that does not reward defectors with "reductionist" tendencies, i.e. the effects of system on parts is the sole root for policy creation (Olssen, 2015). We need to transcend these notions.

[4] The creation of a shared normative structure that transcends cultural nuances, nationalism and historical trauma "to enable people to live and develop strategies to live together and for a common future that are based on conditions of dignity, mutual respect," trust, and prosperity for all (Olssen, 2015).

[5] And, it allows for the adaptation, according to "Nowak and May's (1992; 1993) [of adjusting] 'rules' and 'norms' to the contingent circumstances of time and place" (Olssen, 2015). And, this way, we developed Axelrod's model of cooperation into a "generous tit-for-tat" model; and the Fehr and Gachter's, if I pronounce their names right, idea of "altruistic punishment" which increases cooperation (Olssen, 2015).

So, the complex order at any level is "regulated" with constructed ethics which encourage the constant emergence out of uncertainty and randomness of interactions. This is the norm that we experience today. This way, institutions at any level become preconditions for development, freedom, individual, and communal well-being and prosperity. The concept of "anarchy" is overcome with a complexity approach and survival transcends the security dilemma and Thucydides' trap. Main parameters of governance become the themes of co-evolution, holism, non-reductionism, the entanglement of the micro with the macro and the importance of the micro for the survival and evolution of the macro structures; part-whole interactions become very important and a "metaphysical" transcendence of history and historical trauma, so that, an "ontological orientation to politics and IR provides a different understanding of possibilities or not for collectivities to negotiate and realize a common future" (Olssen, 2015. This is very important because we can actually create policy and conflict resolution processes on this notion. And, policy is ultimately created based on indeterminism and free will in order we can accomodate randomness and uncertainty in this day also in indeterministic approaches, not the classical determinism that we see in traditional IR theory (Charalampaki, 2021); and free will in order to reduce randomness, which is ultimately what creates disorder and conflict. Thank you so much for your time and attention, I really appreciate it.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Effie, thank you so much. This was a great presentation actually, and you showed us how IR theory can be used for solutions. Now, we can continue with Miranda Christou, but as far as I know, maybe Dilek can help us here, that she couldn't make it.

PRESENTATION BY DİLEK LATİF

I would like to say that I'm presenting on behalf of my colleague Miranda Christou and myself. Unlike Effie, we have not structured our presentation in a theoretical way. It's just the opposite. It's a qualitative research based on interviews that we hope to put some light about the gender issues in Cyprus that could help policymakers to consider women's perspective about solution and, Miranda actually couldn't make it. But, we have a common presentation that I'm going to share with you. And it's a bi-communal project. It is called "Gender and Peace in Cyprus: The Role of Women in Reconciliation Process". We just started actually by September this year, although the project was drafted two years, just before the pandemic, and American embassy actually, because we are both Fulbright scholars, really liked the idea of having a gender input into the Cyprus conflict. The starting point of the research, let me go back to the origin, is that in all academic research and different types of opinion polls, the data shows that women have less enthusiasm for a federal solution for a united Cyprus, they find it very risky.

So we wanted to understand, what are the concerns, fears, insecurities of woman that make them very cautious about solution. They prefer status quo. Although the island is divided, at least it's safe. So we want to understand, as I said, although this was two years ago because of the pandemic, we couldn't carry out the interviews because that's our methodology to reach out women, especially out of the urban centers find them because, there are very few elite women or academic women that are involved in the peace process. Although very limited number, which is not enough, that's the other point, but we wanted to look at the concerns of women outside of the power centers, and just have an input that hopefully could help their voices heard. And, maybe it can bring us a different perspective. So, I will try to share the PowerPoint presentation I prepared on behalf of us, Miranda and I, as I said, it is a bicommunal project and we collaborate, and we do the same interviews, same questionnaires, both for the south and north Cyprus. As I said, Miranda Christou from University of Cyprus in the Republic of Cyprus is a collaborator of that project. So, sustainable peace in Cyprus can be achieved when both women and men become part of a negotiation and reconciliation process. And what we have seen so far -the opposite from both communities- is the marginalization of women in the political process and the perpetuation of stereotypes that continue to see women a secondary agent in these procedures. And earlier research has shown that high level talks discuss issues of peace and security mostly from a

militaristic perspective, leaving out the social and gender dimension of peaceful coexistence.

On the other hand, gender perceptions are regarded as a precondition for sustainable peace, as gender is an important variable that defines different experiences and dispositions. Women experience conflicts much different than men. And in order to understand the gender root causes of security, fear, distress as drivers of conflict, reliable gender data is needed. So just to give you a perspective about the previous academic research done in Cyprus, but there are also lots of different surveys and opinion polls show similar results. One was PRIO Cyprus Center research on the prospects of reconciliation, coexistence and forgiveness in Cyprus is in the post-referandum period in 2007, that I was involved in as a researcher and author of the PRIO report that you can download it actually from the PRIO Cyprus Center web page (Sitas, Latif & Loizou, 2007).

And the Security Dialogue Initiative, which is a relatively more updated, the gender score research, both studies have shown that women are more skeptical than men in their approach to the peace process and to the resolution of terms of the Cyprus problem. Although there is more than 10 years gap between these two researches, the results have not changed much. According to the Prospects of Reconciliation, Coexistence, and Forgiveness research of PRIO women are more cautious and socially insecure then man in Cyprus.

On the prospects of reconciliation, coexistence and forgiveness woman perspectives has relatively been less positive. And women have been more prudent about crossing the border and tend not to cross because of the discomfort.

The Gender Score research findings also show that both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot women experienced heightened insecurities, and they are generally more skeptical of the peace process than men (Koukkides-Procoupiou, 2017).

Cypriot women experienced stronger sense of mistrust compared to men, higher levels of negative stereotypes, have less meaningful contact than men with the other community and regard "united federal Cyprus", if achieved to be, a fragile state.

In this line, the UN Security Council sent a very clear message this year in January, 2021, stating that:

Now it's time to ensure that women are at the forefront of efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue. Women are affected by conflicts directly and

indirectly, and often in ways that are different to men. But too often, they are absent from the peace process. Therefore, an inclusive peace process must involve a conscious shift to focus towards women. So women shouldn't only be in the room, but, must also have a voice at the table. Actually the interviewers use very interesting phrases like women shouldn't be in the room just as a decoration, just to fill the woman quota. They use this word "decoration" most of the time. So that was very interesting. They want women really to be involved in a way that they could change and make an impact. So they must have a voice at the table at every stage from peace negotiations to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconciliation. And this is the message of the UN Security Council that we believe this should not, in year 2021, be a controversial step or concept. Women's meaningful participation in and influence on the process reflects a normative human right. In addition to involving women in every step, gender perspectives should also be incorporated throughout the whole process.

And that's actually the message transferred through the local friends of UN women, Peace and Security agenda in Cyprus, and they are compelled to highlight the conviction that Cyprus peace process would benefit from a more inclusive approach through the full involvement of women in Cyprus peace process in line with UN Security Council Resolutions, we are hopeful and environment conductive to the resumption of formal negotiations and achievement of a sustainable solution for all the people of Cyprus that can be created.

So that's the actually message transferred by the Australia High Commissioner to Cyprus, Ambassador of Ireland, Ambassador of the Netherlands and Sweden. And that was actually an article published in http://cyprus-mail.com.[i] So there's a real gender difference with respect to safety and an inalienable insecurity of women on both sides of the divide, who are primary homemakers and pillars of both societies.

On the other hand, most foreign funded bi-communal early research on gender, up to now remained on elite level, which is primarily focusing on urban centers, such as Nicosia. There has been a lack of research on the main concerns, mistrust, fears, and security needs of women living outside of the city centers, urban centers, and in the rural areas across the divide.

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[i] Sam Beever, Deirdre Ní Fhallúin, Elke Merks-Schaapveld and Anders Hagelberg, "Women in leadership is essential for Cyprus peace building process", *Cyprus Mail*, 30 June 2021, available at: *https://cyprus-mail.com/2021/06/30/women-in-leadership-is-essential-for-cyprus-peace-building-process/*, (Accessed: 4 December 2021).

Considering the woman's insecurity transforms in skepticism and resistance for peace and reconciliation, acknowledging their perceptions are inescapable for a sustainable peace in Cyprus. So, women perceptions need to be identified to shape local solutions for peace and to improve the perspective of a long lasting solution in Cyprus. As I mentioned in the rest of my presentation, I would like to talk about our research project that we carry on in collaboration with Miranda.

So the gender and peace in Cyprus project is funded by the American embassy in Cyprus. And the aim of the project is to explore how women in Cyprus understand the reconciliation process and how they see themselves involved in the political life of the island. This project aims to provide data that can inform policy makers in drafting of resolutions towards a success agreement into the Cyprus conflict. Having separated women's input and insights would allow creating a better policy perspective that could enhance the role of women before and after a solution of this Cyprus problem.

Considering that maybe more than half of this population in Cyprus is women, this is actually what we hope to have a contribution on Cyprus problem. So our aim is to capture not only the concerns of women vis-a-vis the political process and the prospects of a solution, but also to identify whether distance from the centre of political negotiations makes a difference.

Inclusion of women's perspectives in the peace process would also improve mutual understanding, trust, empathy, compromise and the sustainability of a possible settlement.

The project methodology, as I try to explain shortly in the beginning, focuses on women's perceptions outside of the city centers, basically were marginalized, and rural areas across the divide in Cyprus. And more specifically, we try to identify women who live in the provinces of the south and north of the island. Not just the Nicosia. As most research, you know, exchanges of bi-communal activities takes place in Nicosia, which is the divided city and the capital of Cyprus. So, to mainstream a gender perspective at the grassroots level, this project will combine qualitative and quantitative research techniques and methods. And we actually have in mind to have three methods: a quantitative questionnaire, semi-structured interviews with 40 women and two focus groups, one with Greek Cypriot women and one with Turkish Cypriot women.

A quantitative questionnaire: We thought about having 500 first, then, we thought this may be better to increase it to 1000, to have a better representation. And that would chart the opinions of women in Cyprus from different

geographical, educational, socioeconomic backgrounds. We haven't started the surveys yet. The results of this will form the basis for the qualitative questions which will explore in depth the divergence of attitudes among women. It would be based on random sampling. And there are not enough quantitative studies that focus on women, especially with regards to differences between the different groups of women as well, that would be a good input.

Semi-structured interviews with 40 women: Actually, our sample is women who have leadership positions in their communities, such as mukhtars, municipal council members, school councils, parents associations, and different types of social, political, voluntary, charity, or religious organizations. When you look at women on both sides of Cyprus, women are quite active in NGOs and in various associations, but not in politics directly. The representation of women in the parliaments is quite a few. As well as, there are very few female members in any negotiation things. So we wanted to have actually the position of women who have leadership position in their communities, not in politics, but, having different contributions in their societies. And basically it's where the associations.

The focus groups: We want to have one with the Greek Cypriots with few women who are like really active and want to be part and the Turkish Cypriots and ideal would be to have a mixed focus group, but they locked down the closure of the border during the, pandemic, how to say that at the peak of the pandemic last year in winter, the border was closed down. And again, it was impossible to go to the other side, same for Turkish and Greek Cypriots. So we don't know actually how this winter will be, as the number of COVID cases are increasing on both sides of the island. And there were some worries that the border might temporarily be closed again. We'll see how we can proceed because, so far, pandemic changed the face of our research.

So, we started with semi-structured interviews and out of 40 we interviewed 18 women from different ages, professions and regions in Cyprus. They were all very eager to participate in our research, and they really supported the idea of having a gender perspective in Cyprus question. Some of the interviewees had direct traumatic experiences from the 1963 events. They have mostly that's, missing persons in their families, and some of them have been displaced. They'd been refugees in 1974 war. Although the women we interviewed had different professions, social status, all of these women are involved in different associations, in charity organizations and they have active involvement in their communities.

So before I share with you some of the direct quotations from the interviews, I would like to describe the survey actually. It's a semi-structured survey and that consists of five parts. Part A is about demographics. What are their age, where they grew up, if they're married and their family structure? Part B is about their involvement in social, political, voluntary, charity and religious organizations. Some are active members of the church associations and really just this part is not very strong actually in the north. Part C is about bi-communal contact and experience: Whether they crossed the border, if they have been involved in anybody coming to an activity or event, their impressions about the other side, and their thoughts, questions and feelings about the buffer zone when they cross the border. And Part D is about their experiences on views about the political situation in Cyprus and their understanding of what needs to be done. And Part E, the last part, is about their views on peace, security, negotiation process, gender equality, women's participation in the peace process. We also ask them about their views about forgiveness and also reconciliation, whether it is possible to forgive and reconcile basically, and what we should forget for that and what we should remember. I just wanted to share with you a few direct quotations. They have different encounters and interactions with the other community, as well as involvement in bi-communal activities and events. And just few ideas, just few expressions about the buffer zone:

"The border and the buffer zone always remind me the war. And I don't want to remember those days anymore."

And, and the woman says: "I've been in the buffer zone so many times, but it doesn't mean anything to me anymore. I just see it as an identity check place... But soldiers, rifles, flags are always the things that frighten me…."

"When I showed the buffer zone to my friends from abroad or when I cross the border with my children, this woman has two children aged eight and five, I have a hard time trying to answer their questions... What I feel at this point is always helplessness."

Most of them underline the need for a peace on the island. Some talk about two different states. Some says, "I don't mind whether it is two different states or a federal state. I just want a solution". Basically the woman we interviewed actually would like to see that a solution could be reached, but they are quite skeptical whether this could be reached throughout in their lifetime and whether they would be able to see it with their own eyes.

Another common point is their distrust of the leaders, political leaders, presidents, who aren't actually negotiating and the politicians in general and the negotiation process in Cyprus.

How they define Cyprus problem is as the desperation and as helplessness and it's because of the great powers interests that we can't do much. We are the grass at the feet of the elephant. Wrong policies... Some talks about the psychology of war that actually we are passing from one generation to the other, as long as there is no solution is found. Yes, it needs to be resolved, but it getting worse and it is being pushed further.

So as I said, they have very unique definitions for what is peace and what is a security. Maybe I can go to that part later, as Aslı wanted me to summarize, there's some talks about the role of trust, insecurity and peace and whether it is possible to forgive and forget.

As I saw, they all supported women's participation in negotiation on peace process. Enthusiasm is always shadowed by the distrust of the mainstream politics, leadership and the negotiation process overall. These are the Greek Cypriot women's interview responses: The women who we interviewed think that women should be in the peace process, because women might bring a different perspective, because women would be able to use not just the political strategy, but their emotions as well, and maybe come up with a different solution or maybe things could be move more faster because, it's like women have solution-oriented perspective.

There is a very interesting quotation here making an analogy with a theatrical play, "Waiting for Godot". So for all those years waiting for a solution, being disappointed and then, it's still there, going back to where you started. It's a timeless problem for some of them. These are the feelings about the buffer zone. I think the Greek Cypriot political narrative might also make influence on that.

For some of the Greek Cypriot women, presence of Turkish troops is as a kind of risk. Similarly, they shared that they don't like guns. They don't like soldiers.

Overall, as I said, this project aims to support development of a public atmosphere on Cyprus, a social dynamic that could promote a constructive intercommunal engagement and a constructive dialogue of woman. Therefore we try to address and find out the specific needs and concerns of women, explaining the underlying reasons for the woman's distrust. Hopefully, this input will create a positive atmosphere for the solution of the Cyprus problem

although there is not much hope. Actually I would like to stop here and thank you very much for listening.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you. It was actually really great to listen to this project. Because this also gives us that Cyprus issue is not only about states or military or conflict, but also about people living on the island and the importance of the gender issue. I guess, talking about these issues that we ignored so far could make Cyprus normalized. What we need is to normalize the island in order to really start healthy discussions. And as you all understand Dilek Latif is really an expert about this conflict resolution and peace studies. With a delay, let me now give short information about her.

She is an associate professor in the Department of International Relations at the Near East University in Nicosia, Cyprus. She obtained her PhD from the Middle East Technical University with a thesis on peacebuilding in ethnically divided societies with the focus on Bosnia-Herzegovina. She was a Fulbright visiting scholar in Negotiation, Conflict Resolution and Peace Building programs of the California State University and her research interests are in the area of conflict resolution and peace studies focusing on peace-building and reconciliation strategies in divided societies. So she's actually the person who is needed for these discussions and her research has been published in international edited volumes and in peer review journals. Actually, I was one of the lucky ones, who also, have an article with her, which I'm going to also mention during my talk by the way. Okay. Thank you so much Dilek.

Dilek Latif: I just wanted to say sorry, because we just started the project. I couldn't share with you robust research findings, just the preliminary observations, but we thought that this would be a great platform to get your feedback. So it will help us to have progress and maybe a have a good direction. So if you have any comments and suggestions, I would be very happy to hear and share with Miranda of course, thank you.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: We will be happy, too. I actually took many notes about the project. They are coming. Thank you so much Dilek. Now we can continue with Altuğ Günal, so before I give the floor to him, I would also like to give short information about him. Günal is an associate professor at Ege University whocompleted his undergraduate and graduate studies in Ege University, Department of International Relations and his doctorate in European Studies at Dokuz Eylül University. He completed part of his doctoral courses and doctoral dissertation at the University of Exeter and at the University of Zagreb for post-doctoral studies. He was a visiting professor and he did his research and work at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology,

Aalborg University, and Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University (as a note, we will actually have another participant from this university, Vakur Sümer), and the University of Oxford. He still works as International Relations Cordinator of our university, Ege University and a faculty member at the Department of International Relations. He is also the historical consultant for the Cyprus Peace Operation Museum at the Foça Amphibious Marine Infantry Brigade. So he's coming from this kitchen, I guess, the peace operation and the technical issues., His academic interests cover the Cyprus problem, Balkans, humanitarian interventions, responsibility to protect and European Union. So now the floor is yours Prof. Altuğ Günal.

PRESENTATION BY ALTUĞ GÜNAL

Thank you, Aslı. Dear participants, dear audience, I would like to greet you all. It's a great pleasure for me to be here in the same symposium with this precious audience and distinguished speakers from Cyprus, from Greece, from Turkey as well and I would like to thank my colleague Aslı, especially for inviting me to this organization. I know she worked a lot on this.

The Cyprus issue has been on the international communities' agenda for more than 60 years or around 65 years and still waits a solution. And all parties suggested that federal state for the solution until recently, however things have changed as the Turkish part now defend that wasted decades on negotiations prove that a solution based on federation was not possible. Therefore, it would be meaningless to run after an impossible mission for other decades to come.

And now the two-sovereign state formula is proposed by the Turkish party, but however, all the other parties and the international community continue to insist on federative state and declare they won't support any other kinds of solution. In this regard, for today, I decided to do something a little bit different and compare another failed federal experience, namely Yugoslavia to Cyprus, and see if we can find some similarities or draw useful lessons for Cyprus' future. Sure, 15 minutes will never be enough for that, but I will try to give some insights.

Anti-federalists in Cyprus like to use the Yugoslavia experience to prove that there should be no federation in Cyprus because it won't work just like Yugoslavia's didn't. Of course, besides the similarities that are serious differences between Yugoslavia and Cyprus, however, evualating this failed experience, which is in the same region with Cyprus, where, just like Cyprus, Muslims and Christians and different ethnicities live together, having their motherlands outside, -if you accept as motherlands for sure and also which were non-aligned countries, where majority-minority problems occured, disagreements on the interpretations of history, self-determination and federation concept prevails. I think this may make apparent what future pitfalls upcoming Cyprus federation or model could face and maybe help preventing making similar mistakes again.

Cypriots have been affected from the events in Balkans in general and Yugoslavia in particular and also been a part of it. For instance, in Cyprus, the term Balkans was used in the meaning of unity and cooperation before the conflicts began in Yugoslavia and also in the meaning of dissolution, conflict and hostility in the years of clashes. In 1930s in the mixed village of Pyla, my friends would know here, my colleagues, the mixed football team, composed of

Turks and Greeks was named Balkans and while Greek Cypriots sympathized their Serb Orthodox brothers, Turks took side with the Muslim Bosniacs. Cypriots used the events and rhetoric in Yugoslavia in order to defend their own arguments on Cyprus. And in 1990s, two communities in Cyprus started to use the term ethnic cleansing for what the other party did, when they saw that the term helped international community to act in Yugoslavia. Turks use the term for the years between 63 and 74, for sure. And Greeks used the term for the Turkish intervention in 1974. Turkish Cypriots linked the Srebrenica and other massacres in Bosnia to the events in Cyprus, and claim United nations alone was not and will not be able to protect Turks against the Greek Cypriots if the clashes start again and on the contrary, the Greek Cypriots say the UN protected Muslims in Bosnia, but has done nothing to protect the Greek Cypriots in Turkish intervention in 1974.

While it's a common belief in the Turkish side that Christian West would not protect Muslims, Christian Greeks believe that the Catholic West has a prejudice against the Orthodox. It was similar in Yugoslavia as well. Serbs had also claimed that Western media deliberately show Orthodox Serbs as postmodern vampires. And in both Cyprus and Yugoslavia, parties accused each other of irredentism and also having big dreams as the others accused Serbs of dreaming of greater Serbia or Serbs accused Albanians, for instance, of dreaming a greater Albania, Turks accused Greeks of dreaming a greater Greece, I mean, Megali Idea, or Greeks accused Turkey with neo-Ottomanism. This term was first used after the 1974 intervention. Let's return back to the federalism issue. Federalism tries on one hand to protect the diversity and on the other hand to ensure national unity. Even though until recently Turkish and Greek parts claimed they compromise on federalism, I believe it was not the real case. They never agreed on its form. And federal state does not have recognized stable, strict rules. So each federal state may be unique to itself. Therefore, what Turkish and Greek parts understood from federalism has always been completely different from each other. Just like it was the case in Yugoslavia.

In Yugoslavia, Croats, and Slovenes with lesser population, envisioned a loose federal model where they would enjoy greater autonomy, but the more populated Serbs demanded a more centralized federal state. However, as Yugoslavia become looser in time, especially after 1974 Constitution, Serbs became agitated and thought Yugoslavia was being divided by Croats and Slovenes. It was a separatist movement for them. Likewise, in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots demanded more centralized while Turks demanded looser federalism.

At the end, the Greek Cypriots in 1960 Cyprus Republic believed the federation was too loose. Turks had too much autonomy and they were trying to divide the Cyprus. It was what Greek Cypriots thought at the time. Actually Croats were concerned about forming a federation with Serbs from the very beginning because they knew that they could be subordinated even if the system was federative. However, they insisted on federation in Yugoslavia and thought this could be step on the road for independence in the course of time for sure.

Contrary to this, Serbs saw it as a step for a more unitary state in time. While forming this Cyprus Republic, Cypriots were doing similar plans with the Yugoslavs. Greek Cypriots hoped that the system would become more unitary in time while Turks would feel safer in a bi-zonal state. In time Yugoslavia went into direction of too loose federalism, but on the contrary with Makarios' thirteen amendments to the constitution, Cyprus become almost unitary. Both caused erosion of legitimacy of the states. However representing the strong sides, both Milosevic's and Makarios' answers to the incompetence of the federal system was to centralize the governments.

In the literature on federation, one of the most important facilitator for a lasting federation is seen as a sense of common history and identity among the citizens. However, neither in Yugoslavia, nor in Cyprus, the federal identity was over the local or ethnic identities. The main idea behind the starting point of Yugoslavia was as you can remember, even though they had different religions, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosniacs were relatives, and could live in a single state in order to be safe. However, in Cyprus from the very beginning, no such rhetoric was used, which claimed that Turks and Greeks were relatives or even similar. Instead, the two communities on the island were sharply divided as Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks. In that sense, 1960 Cyprus Republic had disadvantages from the very beginning.

Unfortunately, Turks and Greeks discovered that they have many things and manners in common more recently. And it is accepted in the literature again that, history of living under the same administration is also a facilitator for a federation. Turkish and Greek Cypriots have lived side by side without interruption like 400 years. However, mostly because the Balkan and the Greek historiography do not commemorate Ottoman period very positively, and since there have been many wars conducted against each other, and also with the effect of the schoolbooks for sure, the communities chose to remember the bad memories instead of many good ones, thanks to or because of their leaders as well. So this common life under same administrations was not able to create a single nation or at least a common identity in Cyprus. For instance, Makarios

once expressed this situation clearly. He said, "What Cypriot, the only Cypriots in Cyprus are the Cypriot donkeys". And despite the fact that many nations of Yugoslavia were relatives or South Slavs, it was not possible there to create a common Yugoslav identity as well. Even though it was one of the biggest dreams of Tito, he could not succeed on that. On this, there was a common joke in Yugoslavia, which said, Yugoslavia is composed of 6 publics, two provinces, six nations, 15 nationalities, and one Yugoslav referring or making fun of Tito for sure. So, I am quite sorry about this identity issue. The decision to build federation in Yugoslavia was given by their own Yugoslav leaders. However, Cyprus Republic came into existence only or mainly because their motherlands or the UK wanted. So it was a kind of child, no one wanted from the beginning.

Another facilitator for a federation is feeling of insecurity caused by common threat or enemy or need for a common defense against a colonist let's say. An important part of the Yugoslav nations had conducted an independence war against an enemy like Ottoman or Austria. And also after Bolsheviks revealed the secret agreements on Yugoslav territories after the First World War, you would remember that there was an Italian threat as well. So this helped the built of Yugoslavia, however, Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not feel any common threats, not even a common threat from its colonial ruler. They didn't unite against the colonist British and conduct a common independence war unfortunately. Instead, they felt threatened by each other's motherlands and each other as well. And literature says if the parties to the federation have a tendency to fight in opposite coalitions, the federation could not live long, just like the Croats and Serbs chose to fight in different coalitions against each other in the Second World War.

Cypriots also chose to fight in different coalitions in the First World War and Turkey's independence war. So this is also problematic for a future federation in Cyprus. And after Yugoslavs get rid of the foreign rule and external threats were exterminated, they started to put their national interests again over the unity. In the Second World War, Nazi Germany played on Yugoslav differences and made them fight each other, as you could remember. And afterwards, the atrocities, tortures and massacres South Slavs did to each other in the Second World War, and especially the ones between Croat Ustashas and Serb Chetniks created quite strong antipathy or even hatred among each other. This black mark has never left Yugoslav sphere, and they were never able to forget what happened, thanks to their nationalist leaders for sure. Not to Tito. And Serbs were always alarmed and concerned if Ustashism rised again and Croats were always concerned of being subordinated again by Serbs.

This may be similar for Cyprus, too. This time, British played on Cypriot differences and motivated them to position in different conflicting camps as you can remember in 1950s. And the memories of what happened during the 1950s, 63, 67 and 74 has never left Cypriots free. Turkish Cypriots do not forget the period where the Greek side was much stronger and Greek Cypriots do not forget the period in 1974, when the Turkish side became stronger. Not all for sure, but Turks are concerned if left alone, they could be massacred again by the Greek Cypriots. And on the other hand, Greek Cypriots is concerned if Turkey captures the whole island with its superior military power, and they are afraid of the Guarantee Agreements. And at the end, these bad historical events are still the main determinant in the negotiations on federation in Cyprus.

And another issue is related to the proportional representation, which is the main characteristic of the federations. It was also problematic in both cases. While the Serbs and Greek Cypriots demanded representation in proportion with populations, Croats and Turkish Cypriots demanded overrepresentation for themselves. And this disproportional representation was found unjust by Serbs and Greeks as well, which caused an erosion of legitimacy. This is still one of the most problematic topics of Cyprus negotiations today.

And nations of former Yugoslavia and Cyprus do not agree on the reasons of the conflict or the dissolution as well. For instance, for the mainstream Croat writers, it is the Serb aggression driven by the Serbian national character and for the Serb writers, it's the conspiracy of the Catholic West towards Orthodoxy and it was a separatist movement. Both sides claim that their acts were reactional, and Serbs claimed Yugoslavia was an anti-Serb system created by Croat Tito and Croats saw it as a Serb dominated anti-Croat system. And Kosovar Albanians thought the non Slavs were being treated as second class citizens.

Similarly, none of the Cypriot parties were happy about the 1960 Cyprus Federation. Orthodox Greek Cypriots saw it as an unjust structure where Muslim Turks gained much more than they deserved, with the help of pro-Turkish and anti-Orthodox US. And like Bosniaks or Albanians, Turks, believe that they were treated as second class citizens by Greeks. For them, Greeks never wanted to live equally with Turks. So Greeks wanted to break the system at the first opportunity, but for the Greek Cypriots, Turks never wanted the system to work and in order to demand partition, they consciously sabotaged the system.

And if you come to the leadership, as Duchacek stated, for a working federation, the leader of the federal system should have a federal way of

thinking, mentality and federal spirit. And '74 Constitution of Yugoslavia brought a very complex system. And right after Tito, that system started to shake and complex systems needs gifted and capable leaders.

If again, a very complex system would be built in Cyprus in order to answer all the demands and parameters of the parties, it is certain that it won't work without a capable leader, or it will collapse after his death. Even though Tito and Makarios were the prominent names of the non-align movement and close friends as well, their manners were quite different. Tito was a Croat and Slovene, but he never favored Croats and Slovenes over the others. He even strongly suppressed the Croat separatist movements. However, I believe Makarios couldn't show the same virtue. He couldn't play the arbitrator role. Instead, he worked in favor of Greek dominance over Turks. There is no single decision I found of him in history in favor of Turkish demands over the Greeks. If the Yugoslav nations after Tito, or Cypriots had more responsible political leaders, the chain of events might have been different, I believe. So how much federal mind the Cypriot leaders have will also be determinant for the future Cypriot states for sure.

The equality or at least proximity between the parties in population and also wealth is substantial for a healthy federation and Daniel Elazar for instance, very important name for the federation studies, evaluates this kind of inequality as the main reason for the collapse of federations. And this inequity existed in both Yugoslavia and Cyprus. For instance, in 1970s, a widening gap of economic sources between the developed and underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia severely deteriorated the federation's unity and the rich Slovenia and Croatia were unhappy on how their money was transferred to the others. And they didn't want to lift the burden of the poor regions anymore. Some same kind of distress was valid for Cyprus too. And since Greek Cypriots are still wealthier than the Turkish Cypriots, in the upcoming Cyprus Federation, the same problem that Yugoslavia faced may realize. In the first years, especially EU donor organizations and the motherlands should support the convergence of the economies, I believe.

For sure that are much more to say, which could take hours, however, due to the time limits, I would like to stop here and thank you for listening.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you so much Altuğ hocam for this intriguing discussion about the ontology of federation actually, because you compared the case in Yugoslavia and in Cyprus, and then of course you also compare from different sides.

Now, let's, give the floor to our distinguished participant Vakur Sümer. Sümer is an associate professor who has received his PhD on International Relations from Middle East Technical University in Ankara. He is now a faculty member at Department of International Relations at Selçuk University in Konya, Turkey. Vakur Sümer has worked as a postdoctoral fellow at the Global Research Institute at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in US.

He is as a visiting scholar at the Department of Environmental Science and Policy at the University of California at Davis, again in the US and Sümer has been a researcher at Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg, Germany in 2012. And for the time being, Dr. Sümer is the Director of Eurasian Research Institute at Akhmet Yassawi University in Kazakhstan. So we are now ready and looking forward to listen to dear Dr. Sümer. So the floor is yours, Vakur.

PRESENTATION BY VAKUR SÜMER

Thank you so much, Aslı. It has been a pleasure to be here with you all. And I want to thank for your kind invitation. And I also congratulate you on this wonderful organization together with Prof. Hürsoy. And I also congratulate the whole department of you and warm greetings from Almaty, Kazakhstan from the Eurasian Research Institute of Hoca Ahmet Yesevi International Turkish-Kazakh University. Actually, I am not an expert on Cyprus issues in general, but rather I am a student of the water issues in the Eastern Mediterranean and also climate change issues, which are the common problems actually for all of the people of the basin at large, including Cyprus at the center of it, actually.

And as an island, Cyprus has lots of problems in terms of water, as we know, and has emerging problems in terms of climate change as well. In order to deal with these two issues, actually to adapt to climate change and to improve the water situation in the island, Turkey came up with an extraordinary idea of a water transfer in 2015. Actually it was a long project, but, it was only possible to build the project by in the first half of the 2010s. So, the professor who spoke first aptly put that Cyprus issue is a wicked problem. I also use this term for water problems in general as well, because there are so many interests involved in this issue. There is not a single, once and for all solution, it should be a very hybrid and a compound set of solutions, maybe we are looking for. So, and it is also applicable for water scarcity and also climate change definitely. It is even more difficult than the water scarcity itself. And, it does not know any borders and some things; even in Egypt for example, can have any impact on Cyprus. We have seen lots of dust storms appearing in Cyprus because of the pressure differences in the Egyptian territories. So the last segment of the pipeline connecting Cyprus to Anatolia, particularly after several million years of its separation from Anatolia, was put into place in August, 2015.

Apart from this, symbolic importance of some kind of unification in terms of physically, this water transfer from Turkey to Cyprus will have significant ramifications in social, political, as well as economic aspects of life, of the whole Cyprus, and even in the wider neighborhood of the island as well. I would like to evaluate the projects, fundamental specifications, as well as the effect, the possible effects because some of the effects have been seen, but some will be seen in the upcoming years and even decades. Of course, the water transfers are not seen as panacea in water resources literature, because they should be the last resort in terms of solving the water problems. Because they are supply-oriented solutions which do not have enough capability to stop or satiate the need for extra water. So it always creates for more demand for water.

So, it is not the ideal solution for water problems, I should say first. So Cyprus is, as we all know, the third largest island in the Mediterranean. The island is politically divided into two states, as we all know, Greek Cypriot administration in the south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the north, and while approximately two thirds of the island is controlled by the Greek Cypriots, one third is under Turkish Cypriot control.

And the total population of the island is about 1 million, these days. Cyprus is a water-scarce island. The average precipitation is around 500 millimeters per year, and this is also occurring with great variability in terms of location, as well as time. So, there is no even distribution in terms of time and location. So that is to say, and also there are huge variations interannually as well, not only in the year itself, but also inter-years. So prolonged droughts with precipitations below 300 millimeters per year exacerbate the water problem in the island. For example, in 2008, when Cyprus suffered its fourth consecutive year of low rainfall and drought, the situation reached a critical level, especially in the summer months. And the water was shipped to the island from Greece using tankers in order to ease the island's crisis. So, the crisis also applies for the water situation in the island as well, not only political, economic, but also this environmental, mostly, but also it affects all aspects of life, definitely.

So in addition, the Cypriot government was forced to apply emergency measures, including the cutting of domestic supplies by nearly one-third, it has also been recorded that the annual precipitation figures are gradually falling in the last four decades. So, the climate change is evident in the island. Hüseyin Gökçekuş, then Vice Rector at the Nearest University in the Turkish sector of Nicosia and the General Coordinator of Water in Northern Cyprus Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, has commented on the issue that precipitation decreased by more than a quarter over the last 96 years. So, more than a quarter for a semi-arid island is too much actually. And the groundwater is also being extensively used and resulting in an annual deficit of 14 million cubic meters. And this is also huge for the size of Cyprus. And sea intrusion, the saline water intrusion is quite common around the coast of aquifers.

And according to Gökçekuş again, this is because of excessive water pumping from the wells and nearly 92% of water in the Turkish part of the island is coming from groundwaters. This was before 2015 before the water transfer, of course. And due to the arid climate, furthermore, evapotranspiration consumes as much as 80% of the total annual precipitation. This is in the form of rain, of course. Precipitation includes rain and snow. But for the Cyprus, this is definitely the rain. So 80% is absorbed by evapotranspiration which is

evoparation and the transpiration of the plants. So as a rule, of course, irrigation is necessary from late spring to late autumn to sustain crop production. And around half of the Island's territory is arable land. One of the most agriculturally important parts is the central plains of Mesaoria covering some 2,500 square kilometers. Agriculture is without no doubt the biggest use of the water in the island and following agriculture tourism is the second biggest water-using sector. There have been various approaches in order to tackle with the water scarcity in the island. Desalination is one of the solutions, particularly in the Greek part of the island while Turkish Cypriots are now beginning to rely on Turkey for fresh water. The Greek Cypriots are building lots of desalination plants in order to improve their water balance.

And conditions of aridity and frequent droughts have, for a long period of time, put a pressure on Cypriots to use their waters wisely. So demand management techniques have always been on the table of options to use water more efficiently. In addition to this general setting, implementation of the European Union's Water Framework Directive has provided a further impetus for the Greek Cypriots to develop demand management solutions in managing their water resources. A cost recovery focused water pricing is one of the most notable improvements in this respect. And it should be noted that power of the WFD, the Water Framework Directive solutions lies in its strong advocation of demand management policies rather than supply augmentation. It also focuses more on the quality-related aspects of water resources, which seems to be somewhat disregarded in the dry areas like Cyprus. So considering the positive effects of the WFD, it should be highly recommended, I believe for Turkish Cypriots, to start exploring possible ways of implementing the WFP norms and principles, which seems to be a complete package for effective water management, regardless of the political processes about the Cyprus.

So of course, we all know this, the details of this broad political problem. So out-of the island water transfers were also tried in recent history. For example, the so-called Medusa bags, which are somewhat cubic bags which can hold tons of waters, were used in the late 1990s with limited success. Carrying of bulk water by tankers was also utilized and water transfers through these options were discontinued mainly because of the high costs and difficulties related to the technical aspects of the chosen projects. Despite this, in emergency conditions, water transfers through tankers are still being realized on an ad hoc basis. So when we look more closely to the water transfer from Turkey through the pipeline, the idea dates back, as I said to early 1990s. One of the alternatives was transporting water to Cyprus through a permanent pipeline

appeared in 1990s as I said, and the pipeline project at that time was not seen as a priority because of its high cost. It was denounced because of its high cost and the popularity of other options as low-cost and technically more feasible alternatives. But the rise of the financial power of the Turkish government, so to speak in the first half of the two thousands and actually the second half of the two thousands as well, it created an enabling environment where feasibility studies demonstrated a positive outlook for the project. Also exploration of natural gas and oil reserves in the seas surrounding the island has triggered a reappraisal of the project from the Turkish perspective. And of course, if it has been achieved and it would be a prestige boost for Turkey and Turkish construction sector to achieve a novel concept of water transfer through buoyant pipes.

So an expert from Turkey's General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works has reported to said that the pipeline you'll be first of its kind and such a suspended subsea pipeline of this size doesn't exist in the world. So starting at Anamur at Mersin, Turkey, at the Mediterranean coast, the project reaches Geçitköy in Turkish Republic of Cyprus after crossing across the sea at a depth of 250 meters, and a number of dams and pumping stations have been constructed in both Turkey and Cyprus. Perhaps as its most important feature, approximately 80 kilometers of the project is the Mediterranean subsea crossing, which is achieved to 1,600 millimeters diameter HDPE, polyethylene pipelines, plastic pipelines actually, which are environmentally safe and also safe for human consumption for water and other liquids as well. And the each segment of the pipeline is 500 meters. So, unlike conventional undersea pipelines, which carry oil and natural gas in steel pipes, the authorities in Cyprus water transfer project needed to utilize a special technique this time. This is because of the basic fact, physical fact that the density of fresh water is lighter than seawater making it impossible to place a HDPE, polyethylene pipes on the seabed. It is impossible. Instead, pipes are placed with suspenders that are installed 250 meters below the sea level and fixed to the seabed through tethers, the fixers.

This innovative and experimental character of the project also created a variable of criticisms as well, mainly based on environmental risks scenarios. The mentioned dangers of this kind of a project included for example sinking vessels, earthquakes, tsunamis, and submarine traffic in the area. However at that time, authorities assured that all risks have been studied meticulously and necessary precautions, including mounting sensors and transmitters at the time of possible damage are taken. According to an expert, again from the DSI, the

State Hydraulic Works of Turkey, the level of 250 meters is deliberately chosen in order to avoid submarine traffic.

It has been apparent from the modern history of the island that there is a high level of mistrust between communities in Cyprus, which seems to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks against further cooperation in any area, including water corporation, unfortunately. The official Turkish rhetoric at the time concerning the project was to be supportive of peace. So this project, according to Turkish perspective, will be supportive of peace. But on the other hand, most of the Greek views are not so sure about this. So for instance, according to a news agency, people in the south of the island believe that once water reaches northern Cyprus, the property value of the TRNC will rise. And in the case of a solution being found to the Cyprus problem, the Turkey Cypriots will demand more money for the return of their lands. Another concern was the agricultural competition that will also become harder from the Greek perspective. That is to say, with water from Turkey crop yields will increase, prices will decrease, the cost will decrease of course, and Turkish Cypriots will become able to compete more fiercely with Greek farms. And finally, for many Greek Cypriots in the island, water transfer from Anatolia is another move from Turkey aimed at strengthening its occupation in Northern Cyprus. Through this way, in Greek Cypriots' view, Turkey tries to increase the dependency of Cyprus to Turkey and the Greek Cypriots generally reach the conclusion that this project will make unification of Cyprus more difficult.

So, in such a context, Greek Cypriots intensified their efforts to augment water supply through desalination. So until now, we do not have a noticeable mentioning of any intention to share the water coming from Turkey and probably in the foreseeable future, this trend will continue as well. Greek Cypriots generally do not want to use Turkish water, something which they can see as making them more dependent on Turkish Cypriots and more importantly, on Turkey. And for many Greek Cypriots, it will be almost unacceptable to live with knowing that their taps are controlled by Turkish hands in far away.

On the other hand, there are also technical limits, because the Turkish official rhetoric was somewhat exaggerating the impact of water that was transferred from Turkey to Cyprus. But, this is not the case in reality about the technical limitations, the amount of water, for example, which is transferred is around 75 million cubic meters per year. Of course, this figure appears to be substantial considering the size of the Turkish side of the island, both in terms of area and in terms of population, but it is not enough to fill the gap in the water budget of the island as a whole. And considering the intensive water use

in the locomotive sector, that is to say tourism in the island, the amount can only saturate the nonagricultural uses. Because agricultural use is the biggest, but it is not like 80%, 90%, like we had seen in most of the arid countries. It is less than that. And tourism is another important sector. So despite the positive attitude from Turkey, it will be technically unrealistic to expect provision of water from this project to south Cyprus, unless an increase in amount of water pumped from Turkey is realistic. And of course, apart from political issues, the project has faced some criticisms from environmental NGOs, including those on the donor basin problems. So they ask simply what about the Dragon (Anamur) river in the Anatolian peninsula? So it is giving, some 75 million cubic meters of its water, but the Turkish authorities at the time said, it is only 10% of the flow of the river. So it is not a big deal. And resettlement at dam sites was also one of the issues.

This is environmental, but also a sociological issue and the risks of wasteful water use associated with water supply projects in general. So as to the donor basin problems, as I said, the Dragon River is not under danger so far. We do not have seen big problems in the donor basin hereto. But, of course the environmental problems are slow processes. So it is yet to be seen, less than a decade has only passed. But of course, the anticipated risks of climate change and temporal changes in water resources in the basin should be monitored carefully all the time. With respect to resettlement issues, the resettled people have actually benefited from the dam from the official Turkish view. And, also they will have a chance to farm some of the 4,000 hectares of newly irrigated areas in Mersin province in Turkey. So, the farmers in Turkish side will benefit from that from the Turkish view. And also estimated production of 26 megawatts of electricity will be an additional benefit. Of course, NGOs have also warned that this type of projects generally do increase the water demand, water need rather than satisfying them.

So, actually new water supplies are not the best solutions or incentives for water saving. There is a big potential for water saving in the island actually. So instead of investing lots of money in such projects, they recommended that, investing more in educational issues or water saving techniques to recycle, reduce, and reuse paradigms, et cetera. Of course, as we can see, there is not a single solution that can easily solve these kinds of wicked problems. It is also more related with the climate change issues. We cannot be sure about the fate of the Dragon River, which is the source of the water that is being transferred from Turkey to Cyprus. We cannot be so sure about its fate in the upcoming decades

because the whole Mediterranean basin is under threat in terms of water scarcity.

In Central Asia too, just to give an example, around quarter of the glaciers have been lost in the last 50 years. Half a century quarter of the glaciers have been lost. The Taurus Mountains in Anatolia is also under threat in terms of climate change and reduced precipitation. So, of course this exaggerated rhetoric has little in explaining complex issues like water management in the island and the climate change issues in the island. Of course this water transfer from Turkey to Cyprus is neither a Trojan horse as some Greek Cypriots claim nor it will instantly bring peace to the island as some Turkish views capitulated. As I said before, Water Framework Directive, which starts in the preamble with that, water has to be regarded as an heritage, not a commodity and it should be treated as such. So this is especially true for Cyprus and for all the Eastern Mediterranean, I am including Greece and Turkey in this regard. So we should be approaching to this water management problems, which are beyond our control generally in terms of investments, our economic capabilities. We should rather be focusing on more on how to save, how to live with less water actually. Maybe this is not so optimistic or not sounding good to the ear, but we should take Israel as a model, which actually creates miracles with less than 200 cubic meters of water. So, Israel is water poor in any water scarcity index. For example, Syria has five times more water in terms of per capita than compared to Israel, but because it doesn't manage its water resources efficiently, it suffers more than Israel actually. Israel has lots of experience which can export actually to other countries, such as the United States for example. There's a term in the literature, an emerging term, like the Israeli bloom or Israeli spring in the middle of the desert with very little water resources. They are actually doing great things. So we should be more on the demand management sides in the final analysis.

Actually this is the summary of what I want to talk for for the time being. I would like to thank again for this wonderful opportunity and this great symposium. And I will be looking forward to seeing the results and also sharing our experiences again in other occasions. You are also always welcome to the Hoca Ahmet Yesevi University and Eurasian Reserach Instute as one of its branches. And I will be also looking forward to the questions and other comments as well. Thank you.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you Vakur Sümer. This is actually something that I was really looking forward to hearing because when we are reading about Cyprus, it's really difficult to find these important topics which

are explained in this political sense because water is actually the most important liquid, even more than the gas. That's how we survive. That's how we live and it's substantial for every part. And in this aspect, of course, what you are also telling us made me to think more about securitization of water, to some extent for both sides. So, for one side, as you already said, it can be a way of a peace, which can be an exaggeration too much and for the other, it can be a Trojan horse. It's also an exaggeration on its own. So maybe this water management issue can be actually a platform for a joint movements and finding a way, which is a way for the solution of a problem, which is crucial for the island. So I'm really looking forward to discussing about these points.

*** Coffee Break

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: I guess we can continue if everybody is back.

Now, I would like to introduce you, Prof. Charalambos Tsardanidis. He studied political science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Athens, BA in European studies, MS in International Relations, PhD at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He taught at the Panteion University as an Assistant professor during the period of 1987-1993, University of Piraeus, Harokopio University, University of Athens and the Hellenic Open University.

So he's currently now a professor at the Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean, Rhodes. I actually would like to underline this part. Because we are, our universities are name siblings because Ege University in Izmir, University of the Aegean in Rhodes. So that's really something I always like a lot. And he is also the Director of the Institute of International Economic Relations. He teaches at the Open University of Greece and at the Neapolis University, Pafos. Articles of Dr. Tsardanidis have appeared in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration, European Foreign Affairs Review and many other well-respected journals. So, I would like to give the floor to Professor Tsardanidis now.

PRESENTATION BY CHARALAMBOS TSARDANIDIS

Thank you. Why the Cyprus problem is lasting for so long. The first refers to the perceptions and the misperceptions prevailing in both communities living on the island: Greek Cypriots and Tukrish Cypriots. Before coming to my topic about the EU involvement in the Cyprus problem, I would   like to emphasise some permanent characteristics of the Cyprus problem. First of all, as I said, it lasts too long, from the 1950s. Of course, there are other conflicts which last for years as for instance the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Taiwan Strait problem.

Although Cyprus is a small territory, the Cyprus problem could not be defined only as a territorial one. It has to do primarily with national identities: the Greek and the Turkish national identities of the Cypriot population. Another characteristic of the Cyprus problem is that many factors play role. I am not referring only to the two mother states, Greece or Turkey, but also to many other countries which have been involved, like the United States, the Soviet Union then, and now, Russia, the European States, and the United Kingdom, as one of the guarantee powers. Domestic factors also constitute crucial elements. And finally, the external dynamics of the region are playing a very important role. I mean the developments in the whole region. For example, what is happening now in the Eastern Mediterranean and its connection with the Persian Gulf, the role of the United States and of Turkey, which emerges as a potential important power in the Eastern Mediterranean? The European Union, of course, has tried to play a role, not a successful one however.

Let me now turn to the EC/EU role in the Cyprus problem. So let's see now, first the historical context. I divided the historical context in the following periods. The first one is from 1971 until 1974, when Cyprus has applied to the then EC for the conclusion of an Association Agreement. During that period, until 1974, the Cyprus problem was not a real issue during the talks. I remember some objections having been raised by the Turkish- Cypriot community and more by Turkey. The fact was that the Turkish Cypriots had realized very well from the beginning that the Association Agreement could bring some benefits for them, especially in the agricultural sector. So the Cyprus problem wasn't an issue in the EC–Cyprus relationship context at this time. The problem started of course, in 1974, with a coup against the Cyprus government organised by the Greek junta and then with the military intervention of Turkey, in July and August 1974. The European Political Cooperation, the then coordination scheme of member states' foreign policy, under the presidency of the French foreign minister Sauvagnargues tried to coordinate its policy with the British as

well as with the United States one. The outcome was to some extent successful, as a ceasefire was agreed between the two opposing parties. This was one of the few, let's say, successes of the European Political Cooperation in that time, as there were a lot of differences between the member states. The third phase of EC's involvement in the Cyprus problem is from August 1974 until 1983. It was a period of indifference. The member states even the United Kingdom were very happy to give up their responsibility for the Cyprus problem. In other words, they considered that the Cyprus problem was under the responsibility of the UN General Secretary who was trying to offer his good offices for bringing the two opposing parties close with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom in the context of the intercommunal talks. In 1978 the British and the US governments together with Canada proposed a plan for a solution which was rejected. So the Europeans were considering the Cyprus issue as a hot potato issue and they were unwilling to be involved.

The next period is that of 1983-1995, during which the Cyprus Republic signed a Customs Union Agreement with the European Union (1987). In 1983, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was declared by Northern Cyprus which was categorically condemned both by the UN and the EC. Actually, no state has recognized Northern Cyprus as an independent country with exception, of course, of Turkey. However, in real terms the European Union was not involved in any attempt for a solution, with the exception of the United Kingdom. In 1993 Cyprus government submitted its application for full membership in the EU.

The most interesting development, which I think pressed the EU to be involved in the Cyprus problem was during the period 1995-2004, when the Cypriot government decided to apply for a full membership. In the same period the member states and the EU, on the one hand, are obliged to deal with the problem of Turkey's relationship with the EU and on the other they had to consider the Cyprus application for membership which from an economic point of view, was difficult to be rejected. However, some member states tried to link Cyprus application for membership with the Cyprus problem, like the Netherlands and to certain degree Germany. But Greece as a full member state of the EU was able to give its support to the Cyprus membership and managed to link it with the whole issue of the enlargement to other East European States which was due to take place in the same period. Also, the Greek diplomacy was successful in its efforts to argue that the Cyprus problem should not be allowed to impede Cyprus membership. On the contrary, the prospect of Cyprus membership could facilitate the US/UN efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. So,

the European Union member states realised that by accepting the Cyprus application, a new momentum for a successful outcome of the intercommunal talks could be achieved. Therefore they supported   Annan Plans, proposed by the then UN General Secretary. Furthermore, in the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, Greece managed to link the Turkish application of EU membership with the Cyprus membership. The member states decided that the Cyprus question was not a prerequisite for accession, although a solution according to the Annan plan prior to accession was deemed to be highly desirable.

But as you know, there was a change in the administration of the Republic of Cyprus and the Annan Plan never materialized as the majority of the Greek Cypriots rejected it by a vast majority in the referendum which took place in April 2004. Most of Greek Cypriots were not persuaded that the Annan Plan provided a good solution, given that the Cyprus membership had already been secured. I am not sure whether the negative outcome of the referendum could be considered as a victory for the Greek Cypriots because many member states and many supporters of Cyprus in the European Union, and especially in the European Parliament were deeply disappointed by the Greek Cypriots' decision.

On the other hand, soon after the Cyprus membership materialised, EU member states and the European Parliament were equally disappointed by the Turkey's stance, which continued not recognizing   the Cyprus Republic, although it was obliged to do so according to the provisions of the EU – Turkey Association Agreement.   Consequently the Cyprus government managed to continue its previous policy of supporting the creation of a federal bicommunal state through the intercommunal talks. The two communities have different positions on the content of a federal state. In this respect, we have to point out that the Cyprus Republic, after its independence in 1960, although a bicommunal state, was not a federal state. The Turkish Cypriots, according to the constitution, were not considered as a minoriry but as a community with special rights. Even today, many Greek Cypriots are unable to understand the difference between minority and community.

 Now, allow me to point out the most important factors that still play an important role for the Cyprus problem from the European Union perspective. Although the member states still play an important role in the formulation of EU foreign and security policy, which means that they do not adopt common positions on many international issues, as far as the Cyprus problem is concerned, they share a common position. For example, they have declared in

many occasions that the Cyprus Republic is   the only legitimate state on the island and they insist that the intercommunal talks is the appropriate method for the definition of the conditions for the creation of a bizonal bicommunal federal state.

Undoubtedly, an important factor in the Cyprus problem is the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot priorities and considerations. The main problem of the Turkish Cypriots community is their need to be legitimized in order to obtain an official status in the international community. On the other hand, the most important tool which the Greek Cypriot government has at its disposal is exactly the fact that it is recognized by the international community as the only legimate government of Cyprus. Therefore, in order to abandon this advantage, they have to take something in return, especially in the field of security, as the real problem for them is the presence of the Turkish troops on the island. On the other hand, for the Turkish community and especially for the current Turkish administration, the solution would be the recognition of the de facto separation of the island into two independent states. The total withdrawal of the Turkish troops as the Cyprus government demands is unacceptable to them given the experience of what happened in the period between 1963 and 1974.

The second factor is Turkey's policy, which is a very important country in the whole Eastern Mediterranen region. It has a role to play, and also is a candidate state for full membership to the EU having opened membership negotiations. However, many states in the European Union are not willing to accept Turkey as a full member   for various reasons. One of them is Turkey's policy towards Greece and Cyprus. But I think for some member states there are other additional concerns. For example, the fact that Turkey is too big to be absorbed, which is the position France, among other member states, has adopted. So, most of the member states, in the exception of Spain and some others, consider, for the time being, Turkey as a problem and not as part of the solution of the Cyprus problem.

A third factor refers to the policy of specific states regarding the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean; I have already mentioned one member state of the EU, France, which, after the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, is attempting to increase its political and military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean by supporting Greece and Cyprus. In this way, Paris under the Presidency of Macron considers increasing its influence in the European Union as a whole. There are also other member states willing to play a mediative role in the Greek- Turkish dispute like Germany. However, Germany, despite the fact that it is the strongest state in the European Union,

economically speaking, after the recent election is in a transitional period. We have also to take into account the fact that, traditionally, Berlin refuses to undertake a leading role in the EU - it has been characterized as a reluctant hegemon. Therefore, the prospect for Germany to play a substantial meditative role is rather limited. Another new development in the region is the formulation of close cooperation schemes between Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, on the one hand, and between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, on the other.

The fourth factor is connected to the role which the EU could play in the energy security issues and especially the issue of the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean region. On this issue the EU has adopted a position which is not in accordance with that of Turkey's particularly in two specific aspects. The first is the memorandum between Turkey and Libya on the EEZ which EU considers illegal and invalid. The second refers to Turkey's increased gas exploration activities in the Greek and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones. The EU expressed full solidarity with its two member states. The European Parliament and the European Council consider these activities as illegally increasing the tension in the region. In the case of Cyprus some sanctions have been imposed on Turkey although very soft ones.

The other issue, which is a very important one, has to do with the future of the intercommunal talks. EU has not been involved in the talks after Cyprus admission to the EU. During the Annan Plan negotiations, the EU and especially the Commission played a very constructive role promoting the application of Community law if a federal Cypriot state was to be created. But nowadays EU considers that Cyprus problem is a United Nations' one despite the fact that Cyprus is a full member of the EU.

It is true that during the previous years there were some opportunities for a resolution of the Cyprus dispute but the opposing parties were not able to agree. Regarding the Creek- Cypriots government and political parties, I am not sure if they are able to formulate a satisfactory strategy I'm not sure if their policy is very clear. It seems to me that their objective is to preserve the current situation on the island despite declarations made that they are willing to contribute to a peaceful settlement if some conditions are met, among which the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the island.

With regard to the position of the European Union as far as the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, during the 1970s, the then European Community made clear, that the Association Agreement should benefit both communities. It is true that since 1974 EU tried to bring the two communities

together by funding some common projects. One was the sewage project in Nicosia. But generally speaking, the European Union should not be very proud of its involvement in the Cyprus problem. Looking back at the whole period since 1970, EU tried to avoid the problem, and it was involved in the problem only when it was pressed to take position or to confront the consequences of Cyprus application of membership to the Union.

What about the future? What kind of a solution could be found? One option would be the creation of a Federal Bizonal State which is favoured by the European Union. But, what about the two communities, despite their declarations? The leadership of the Greek Cypriot community is striving for a bizonal Federation with strong powers entrusted to the federal central government; meanwhile the Turkish Cypriot is in favor of a loose federation with characteristics of a co- federal state. Obviously there is a clear difference between co-federation and a federation. The current Turkish Cypriot administration, however, has proposed a two-state solution for Cyprus despite its prior rejection by Greek Cypriots.

Another option would be a "velvet divorce" through the creation of two independent separate states. The Greek Cypriots could recognize an independent Turkish Cypriot state subject to the return of some land (peace for land) and subject to a substantial number of refugees returning to their homes in Varosha and Morphou, for example. That is not a popular option for the Greek Cypriots although some of them might consider it.

Another option would be the annexation of North Cyprus to Turkey, but I don't believe that the majority of Turkish Cypriots - even including the Turkish settlers in north Cyprus - are in favor of such a development for various reasons. A lot of people in Northern Cyprus, mainly for economic reasons, still support Northern Cyprus becoming part of the EU despite the fact they have been disappointed in 2004, as the majority of Greek Cypriots had rejected the Annan Plan envisaging a Federal Republic, part of the EU.

Another theoretical option would be a double "enosis", a double unification, which is a version of the Turkish policy of 1950's "Taksim" (separation). I'm not sure if this option could be considered nowadays for many reasons: realistically speaking, Turkey would not be very willing to share another border with Greece next to its south coastline with a substantial number of Greek troops camping on the island. I am also sure that the majority of Greek Cypriots consider this option as unthinkable as South Cyprus will become a province of Greece and they are afraid of loosing the benefits of living in a small but very wealthy and very well functioning state. Of course there are still

some Greek Cypriots dreaming of enosis. But especially for them double unification (double enosis), is an anathema. So, speaking about all these options, I have to stop here and I'm ready to answer your questions. Thank you.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you so much, professor Tsardanidis for this really enlightening presentation. So it's really good to actually hear everything in a nutshell. So what happened with the Cyprus issue, the factors about it, the actors and how the EU actually became a part of this issue, reluctantly, and then turned into an organic part of the issue. So we also heard different possibilities about the political situation of Cyprus from you. So if I may actually, I would like to add some, I mean, share some of my ideas. So it means that I would like to put my chairing position and then go back to participants' position a little bit if I may.

PRESENTATION BY FERİDE ASLI ERGÜL JORGENSEN

I would like to talk about identity here because that's something identity is actually a term that is like following you everywhere. And you hear and interpret many things into identity. So maybe I am a little bit actually sick about this. So I am hearing lots of identity also today. So, I mean, identity is of course, something important for the Cyprus problem here. And it's always on the move, identity is a concept which is always on the move and it is never finished or completed the settled texture. It's always in the making, which is the case for Cyprus.

And what we need is to see and understand the social identity here. And when you look into social identity, there are two essential motives for societies for their social identities. The first one is actually the subjective, ambiguity reduction. So people need to actually feel safer and clear, they don't want to have the ambiguity in their lives. So this is the first motive. And the second one is actually the boosting of self-esteem. So these two essential motives create social identity, according to social identity theory. For the case of Cyprus, identity is important, but what is more important is that we need to move beyond the conventional binary approach in Cyprus, the binary between Greek and Turk. Maybe this is what we need here, because things are really complicated in Cyprus and it cannot be reduce only in these two categories, among the communities, I mean, in both communities. So of course this is a big job, it's a challenging task, and it's to untangle this complexity. So that's why we need to see different layers of social identity. So it can be supranational, national, religious, and ethnic layers together. And it's the most mainstream, and also conventional approach to identity about Cyprus is that symbolically, I mean, the prioritizing Greece or Turkey, so these have actually stronger relationships.

Actually this idea has a stronger relationship with the threat idea. So it gives way to reduce trust and more prejudice towards the other community. I mean, if the identity is really starting from the mainland identity, the people, who are really bleeding in that way has a more maybe threat feeling. And of course, these ideas can be felt from sentences. Like for example, Turkey is the motherhood or Cyprus is Turkish, or Cyprus is Greek, Greece is the motherhood. So these are actually kind of exclusionary identities which always boost the feeling of threat possibility. And it's of course, difficult to change because these are really supported by collective memory, main narratives, ritual sense, and national celebrations. So within this context, of course, can we talk

about the Cypriot identity, so not Greek only, not Turk only, but Cypriot identity?

So this is also one of the trending concepts: Cypriotism, Cypriot identity. And obviously it is a kind of resistance to the Helenocentric or Turkocentric views. So it looks like, you know, talking to a civic identity formation, or a commitment to a possible joint future. But is it possible that what we actually need to understand here? So actually the surveys recently show that there is a shift towards the more Cypriot centering, mainly for the Turkish part I'm talking now that there is a more Cypriotcentric Turkish Cypriotness. So it's like the Turkishness is also supported by the idea of Cypriotcentric recently, especially, I mean, there's this index, Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index. According to that one, the level is actually rising.

And actually in that index, the representative samples are given the opportunity to choose between different identifications of Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and European. And actually for the first time, there were more participants identifying themselves as Cypriot, which is 43%, compared to Turkish Cypriot, which is 41%. So this indicates that Cypriot-centric views might be on the rise. So it's like, you know, coming. So it can be something actually changing the identity here. But of course, what we are witnessing here is more than just split of identity, especially the Northern Cyprus, because of course there are still some coding called Turks who see themselves as the natural extension of the mainland with their connections of brothers and sisters in Turkey. And they remain grateful to the Turkish military for saving them, so it's a different connection, it's more like an emotional connection, but, of course in parenthesis, we should also say that some Cypriots are actually seeing the Turkish military as an unwelcome power in Northern Cyprus at the same time. And there are also some Turks who, defensively, that is actually an interesting term here, defensively feel more European and, in this way, actually more secular and modern. So they are actually also not that much happy with the incoming of Turkish migrants coming from the motherland Turkey. So there are also these people living in the Northern side. So the identity, I mean, you cannot say that they are not Turks because they are, they are Turks, but at the same time, they have some, actually, questions in their minds.

And also after this feeling, more Turks feeling more Europeans, there are those who emphasize the Cypriot identity over all identities, even including being a Turk. So, and if I am not mistaken, please correct me if I'm wrong, but there are even some radical forms of this Cypriotism among some Turks who are wearing silver crosses around their necks to show actually their connection

even though actually they have no intention whatsoever with being a Christian. So that's a kind of symbol for them. That's a very… I mean, it's a minority, but there are those people. And, of course we also know that there is approximately eighty thousands Cypriots, from the Northern side, came and applied for EU passports. It's a big number for a small society like that. So actually, can we say that these people are coming and applying for the EU passport, I mean, the Cyprus passport, are these people without principles, are these people rejecting their Turkishness? The things are not that easy, because we need to actually think more pragmatically here.

Sometimes, identity should also be understood with some pragmatic terms. And also psychological terms by the way, because, the psychological issues, which make actually Turkish Cypriots to question their identities are important, especially the trauma and devastating history, because they, actually both sides, both communities have big trauma in their histories, so for the Northern side, it can be about, the 1960s period, when actually the Cypriot Turks were outnumbered, and then they were forced to leave.

I mean, that can be the trauma that became the turning point or breaking point for them in their minds. But for the Greek side, it can be of course, thelanding of the Turkish army on Cyprus in 1974, and always the possibility of dividing the island into two. So both sides have their trauma. The memories of victimization actually, so both sides have, they are feeling victimized. And the official narratives of course are always disseminated through, I mean, the societies, over the societies. But at the same time, I guess we also need to understand that this memory of victimization does not last as we expected because the generational transmission of massive social trauma is mostly denied or repressed, because people are sometimes are really done with carrying that heavy burden, because this is a burden that they inherit from the older generations, but sometimes people would like to actually change their societies, the way that they are leaving. They are also hungry for, you know, easy ways of living.

And on that note, I would like to mention our article with Dilek Latif, which is going to be published in Mediterranean Politics soon. It's Different Than Us: Reciprocal Perceptions of the Societies in Turkey and North Cyprus. And in this study, we explore the reciprocal perceptions, main tendencies, prejudices and expectations of the societies in Turkey and North Cyprus. And we also had semi-structured interviews, with 160 people. And actually, this is not the main result, what I'm going to say here, but one of the side results, which really made me very excited to read, or it was something counter-

initiative result. So according to this finding the age groups in both societies, Turkey and North Cyprus are very important as a variable because the young people of Northern Cyprus perceive the Northern part as a petit Europe.

Due to Cyprus' political climate, social life and liberal society, they prefer closer relationships with Europe rather than with Turkey. I guess this is interesting to see because the country is changing, the society is changing and they are asking for peace, they are asking for stability. And another survey, which is also a Moreno method used survey; according to this one the societies were asked the strength and importance of different identifications, as supraordinate and the subgroup identity. So, I actually cut it short and actually the questions of "How do you feel", "What is your identity?" were asked for the survey. So, for the Turkish Cypriot community, only Turkish not Cypriot, obviously this is the most Turkish nationalist part, 7.6%; Turkish and the bit Cypriot 7.3%; and they are the same Turkish and Cypriot is really high 61.8; and Cypriot and the bit Turkish 12.4 and only Cypriot and not Turkish it's around 10%. So what we see here is that Turkish identity is given a high importance, but equally, I mean, Turkish and Cypriot choice is that 61%. For the Greek community part, the results are more or less the same, but with some differences. So for them, the only Greek not Cypriot is least of all 0.8; Greek and a bit Cypriot 5.2; and if they are asked the same extent of Greekness and Cypriot 57.9; and Cypriot and a bit Greek 16.2; and only Cypriot and not Greek 19.9.

In this picture, actually see that the Cypriot identification is higher among the Greek Cypriots, but can we really say that we can compare these two communities and they are actually talking about the same Cypriot identity, because this is also important. Are they really talking about the same Cyprus identity? So, because the term, even though, it's sounds the same can mean different things to these two different societies. So the term Cypriot, denotes the idea that Cyprus has its own sui generis character and identity. But actually this identity, ontologically speaking, has never been an ethnic or national identity, neither for Greeks, nor for Turks, a civic identity, social identity, geographical identity, cultural, yes, but not ethnic or national. So we should be careful about the Cypriot identity here.

And it doesn't mean the same thing to different societies because the Cypriot Greeks are actually eager to accept the Cypriotism as a solution, as long as actually being a Cypriot would not challenge the power or rule of the Greeks in the island. So, being a Cypriot would most of the time be equal to being a Greek for them. There are even some actually interesting examples about this,

some surveys about this, for example, in Spyros Spyros is actually field work, among the Greek Cypriot children, they are asked about actually what do they think about Turkish Cypriots and obviously are they having a structure ambiguity because the first part, Turkish designates as the other, Turkish and the Cypriot part of that Turkish Cypriot designates them as part of the self of themselves, which actually means Cypriot. So for the Greek Cypriot children, actually, there is not that much difference between Cypriot and Greek Cypriot.

So this is also creating some distrust among the Turkish society, because the cosmopolitan, I mean, charged identity can still have some actually burdens of this political problem. So as a conclusion, I don't want to, I hope, I'm not taking too much time, so Cyprus identity actually cannot stand as an ethnic or national identity, but it may bring a promotion of an inclusive form of civic identity. So we shouldn't exaggerate too much. We shouldn't expect being a Cypriot is something ethnic or national, but it can bring a platform of an inclusive form of identity. So, keeping both societies to choose among the identities is also not really good for peace talks because identifying themselves is not only about the identity, but about a political choice, about the country. So this is a big burden. So we need to actually read and understand the society.

The identity is too much politicized. So maybe we shouldn't, I mean, when I say we I mean the social scientists and, everybody outside of island, actually, so maybe we should really let them be free and feel free, without expecting them to inherit the drama-laden legacy of the previous generations. Maybe this is the way of the solution in the long run. So maybe this kind of talking identities can actually create hybrid identities and also solutions for the needs of the societies to live in peace together. Okay, so these are the words that I wanted to share with you.

DISCUSSION

Thank you so much, I guess I can now open the floor for the questions firstly, from the participants about each other, because we all listened to each other and we heard our different perspectives on the same topic. So would you like to ask questions to each other about the presentations? Altuğ Hocam?

Altuğ Günal: Okay, thank you. Thank you for your comments, Aslı. While you were talking, I recalled that studies on Yugoslavia showed that the larger ethnic groups were less resistant in accepting or attaching importance to the Yugoslav identity. The larger groups were less resistant, but the small groups were more resistant against the Yugoslav identity. This can be attributed to the fear of the small groups of losing their identities against the larger groups possibly. However surveys showed that, as you also told us, Cypriot identity among the Turkish Cypriots have been strengthening, but this time, some do not feel threatened by the Greek Cypriots, but unfortunately this time also from Turkey, probably because of too much interference in internal affairs of T.R.N.C., too much subordination maybe and maybe because of people coming from Turkey and settling in T.R.N.C. and influencing or interfering in the daily lives of the Turkish Cypriots. The number of people from Turkey is now higher than the Turkish Cypriots probably, I mean, we don't know the real numbers yet, because since 2011, there is no official census, but probably the number of people from Turkey exceeds and socio-culturally they are different. That's why the [Turkish Cypriots who embrace Cypriot identity] numbers probably increased.

Dilek Latif: I think Altuğ Hoca has a point, but besides he said the regime change in Turkey might also have an impact because Turkish Cypriots identify themselves its secularism, the regime change in Turkey can be another factor, beside the growing influence of Turkey, interference, or whatever, enters T.R.N.C.'s affairs. And also the economic crisis in Turkey can all be added to this that Turkish Cypriots identify themselves with the island and Aslı was talking about different layers of identity. But I think the main reference here is the territory, the island of Cyprus, when they say like Cypriot, they have the strong feeling to the island of Cyprus, where they grow up, where they live, and then they act an ethnicity as Turkish or Greek in this side.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Just a small point on this, from the Greek Cypriot side, after 1974, there was a movement about Cypriotness. The Greek Cypriots in reality are not Greeks as these people were claiming but are descendants of Phoenicians coming from the coast of Lebanon settling in the ancient time in Cyprus, This movement, of course, was a minority movement

but it was supported by some educated persons trying to build a new national identity . At that time in the mid –late seventies a lot of Greek Cypriots were disappointed by the policy followed by Athens in Cyprus and especially by the coup d' etat organized by the military Greek junta. But you see it is quite difficult to build up a new national identity, especially in this part of the world, where nationalism is very strong.

On the other hand, I have in my mind the Macedonian case. The national identity of the Slav people living in the North Macedonia today was build progressively as in the beginning of the 20th century many of them I consider themselves as Bulgarian. Their national identity bulding - seprate from the Bulgarian one - started in the inter-war period and this process was concluded after the Second World War. So I think that the history of the Balkans could provide us with some examples, but I'm not sure if this could apply to the Cyprus case. On the other hand nowdays, in the age of globalization people have started slowly to redefine their affiliation, even their national affiliation, according to their needs. I remember James Rosenau a famous scholar of IR starting one of his article with the following quotation refering to a person living in Milano (Lombardia) "First I'm feeling as Lombardian, then as European. Feeling like Italian it means nothing for me. Why? Because he knows that all his demands and needs could be satisfied not by the central government of Italy but more by the local government of his region, Lombardia, and by the European Union.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you so much Tsardanidis. So actually, we also have a question here, asked by Sevgi Bayrak, so which power can be the solution if the only choice is needed, she asks. She's asking this question to also all of us, anyone who wants to actually talk about this? Actually I would like to ask this question to Effie because, Effie was talking about the system, that was actually an interesting way of taking the Cyprus issue and you were actually talking about, you know, the macro and micro levels and then the system and then how this actually the system, the complexity approach can bring this solution. So do you actually see any power in this, or actor, maybe in this question that can actually be the solution or, contribute into the solution, into this wicked problem, as you mentioned.

Effie Charalampaki: Yes, thank you. Before I started my PowerPoint presentation, that's why I mentioned the wicked problems approach, because it allows for the bottom up approach to governance and also to creating solutions for conflict resolution strategies, the bottom up approach stresses the micro, the role of the micro. So, we cannot go to the global power level in order to create

solutions in protracted conflicts. And, also, it makes sense. We have to come down into the system. We have to get into the micro, which is the civil societies, individuals, the communities that have to find strategies on the ground together. They have to talk; they have to negotiate. And, then, from there, create a platform; create a framework that can also be supported by international institutions and potentially by global powers. And the reason that we see that so far international institutions have failed to bring a solution to the conflict in Cyprus, on the island of Cyprus, something that also Dr. Tsardanidis stressed in his presentation about the European Union, is exactly because we are approaching this kind of conflicts, it's the same situation with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, from a top-down approach, and many times centralized. So, we have centralized governance, that is coming either from a supranational institutions like the European Union, even international institutions like the United Nations where global powers come in accord, and they're trying to enforce their will on the micro. And, then, the people, the communities who are actually living the conflict, who have the historical traumas, who have experienced the histories even through narratives from the previous generations, as you very well mentioned, in their effort to create a common identity to transcend all these obstacles and create a common future, they had like the external factors that are coming from the external environment in the regional or international [level]that are not actually living in a conflict zone and they are trying to impose their will. That's why I brought on the table the complexity approach, because it stresses the bottom up approach. So, in order to have a solution -I read a comment in the chat section where it says "which power can be the solution?"- the power of the people on the island of Cyprus and the complexity science approach that I inherited from James Rosenau and also my personal feeling is that we should leave the Greeks and the Turks aside, and the two communities [on the island] should come together without external influences and talk with each other, find the solution and maybe then bring it to a regional and international level. But, first, it has to be the two communities with Turkey and Greece not exercising any power politics and any influence on the island. I know that this sounds like utopian, but I feel it can be done if there is a will. I know that interests are great in this case, but there's no other solution in protracted conflicts. Thank you so much.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you Effie. Samet actually has been raising his hand. So I would like to give the floor to him for his eager question.

Samet: Thank you so much Aslı Hocam, also thank you so much my department for providing this informative and fruitful conference. So my

question is going to be addressed to Professor Charalambos Tsardanidis. It's a normative question. So, what normative roles should EU undertake, the current EU undertake, for reducing the disparities, the differences between the two different islands [the two communities] and create a common identity, lean on like the democracy, human rights or other European values, or maybe the question is EU identity or European identity is a solution. Thank you so much in advance.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Thank you. First of all, the European Union is not able to exersice its influence in the region. This is obvious also in the Middle East conflict. The European Union is supposed to have adopted a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but for many analysts it is neither common nor foreign policy. Of course this is an exaggeration, but it reflects the reality. Regarding your question about EU sharing common values and norms it brings me to the issue of the Europeanization process and especially the top-down process. That means that the principles, the values of the European Union could transcend the national identity of each member state and could be shared by all European member state and people. For example, you mentioned the preservation of human rights, but even on this, the European Union policy may be considered a bit hypocritical. In fact if the EU was to choose between respecting its values and preserving its security from terrorism and/ or from migration it would choose security. The clear example is the re-formulation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2015 which gives emphasis on security. In the beginning of ENP formulation the EU objective was to Europeanize the Mediterranean countries. Not any more. Furthermore the reason for accepting Cyprus application of membership was the Europeanization process, i.e. the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots could come together and could be Europeanized sharing the same values and principles. There were many projects in that direction. For example, the project of PRIO. We should not forget that the majority of people, even young people, prefer to stay in a secure homeland rather than to abandon it for the shake of living together with another people who, in reality, they do not know and they do not share the same religion or language or national aspirations. I'm speaking about the young Greek Cypriots who prefer to stay in a secure state rather than to live in a new Cyprus federation in the name of the unification of the island. As I mentioned before, this is a contradiction which I do not entirely understand. The majority of Greek Cypriots accept a bizonal bicommunal Federation of Cyprus but, on the same time, they are not willing to make the necessary concessions and sacrifices in order for this Federation to become feasible. In other words, many - not all of them- do not like to live together with

the Turkish Cypriots but they did want the Cyprus problem to be solved. Many are not ready to accept that a new Cypriot Federation would not be an exclusively Greek state as it is the case of the Cyprus Republic since 1963. May I continue to say something, Effie? I do not want to monopolize.

Effie Charalampaki: Yes please, if you have some comments on my presentation, will be highly appreciated and critique, especially because this is ongoing research. Thank you.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Thank you. I'm not sharing your optimism, which seems to me utopian. I have studied the Palestinians and the Israeli approach after the Oslo Agreements. You could find from both sides, Israelis and the Palestinians willing to try to find some common ground. I was surprised, during my recent visit to Israel, to find out that even left orientated Israelis in favor of a rapprochement with the Palestinians considered impossible to live together with the Palestinians. So, we should not take literally Greek Cypriots declarations that they have common grounds with the Turkish Cypriots. We should, of course, encourage Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot rapprochement but don't expect tangible results.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: I actually also would like to ask something to Vakur Sümer, if I may, also you are working, studying on environmental crisis, I mean the climate change. So do you think, with the climate change, the necessity for water, I mean, the scarcity of water will be higher, do you think that it can create a better opportunity for the cooperation between Greece and Turkey, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots out of necessity because the things are even harsher?

Vakur Sümer: Thank you for this great question actually; this is a bigger debate in climate change issues. There are two variants, so to speak. One is saying that the competition for, scarce resources will ultimately bring peace or bring more cooperative atmosphere to the bilateral relations between communities or countries. They will be enforced to enter into a more fruitful dialogue. The second strand of thinking says that this will be not the case because the scarcity that we actually experience these days has been an unprecedented one. And it will definitely trigger much more conflict than peaceful negotiations or peaceful atmosphere of dialogue. But of course, we should hope for the positive one. And there's a lot of ground for this, I believe. But there are on the negative side, we have some examples in other parts of the world that, for example, especially if the resource reveals itself in a zero sum game setting, such as the groundwater's use in the border areas for example, there can be some conflicts, especially in that respect. So because groundwater

basins like the surface waters, do not know any borders and if you draw too much water from one side, it will be the loss of the other side. So there should be some kind of agreements between the optimum utilization of shared groundwater resources. Even countries, in the past, which has seemingly bad relations have been able to agree on these kinds of agreements from the positive side for example, we can see the agreement between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, between Israel and Jordan also.

And the fresh water disputes database demonstrates that the history is full of agreements rather than wars or conflicts in terms of water issues, per se. But this is not a guarantee for the future, because as I can say again to reiterate, the limits, now we are reaching the carrying capacity of our nature resource system in general overall. So it is very difficult to actually predict, make predictions about the future. So we should definitely work for, I mean, we should keep the dialogue active in order to at least to be in an atmosphere of cooperation, we should not isolate our efforts. We should unite instead, and we should work together and at least we should utilize science diplomacy in order to not probably create basin-wide organizations, like we have in Europe or also in Turkey, it will be difficult probably in this setting. But it is, we should work towards that. And there are some examples, successful examples that can be emulated. There are epistemic communities in basins such as the Euphrates and Tigris for example, scientists from different countries, such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria come together and share their data and their finding, research, et cetera.

And in the end, it hopefully translates into some kind of more cooperative policies from all sides of the issue. I don't want to say this as a conflict, but this is definitely an issue. And according to all models, all scenarios Eastern Mediterranean will experience a reduction in precipitation, plus an increase in terms of temperature, which will also increase the evapotranspiration. This will even aggravate the water balance in the region, not only to Cyprus, but also in all other parts of the world.

I want to make a point in terms of desalination which can be an important way out of this water issue, but there are some limitations. First environmentally, it is not so sustainable, if you do not manage it well, you should give the saline water, the brine water to the aquatic environment into the sea back very slowly, very slowly, because otherwise you will kill all the species in the seabed, especially in the seabed, but because it's a dense liquid, it goes to the deep seabed and kills all types of creatures there like shrimps, et cetera.

So it will first environment. And secondly, you need lots of energy for this. You need some kind of big energy sources. So, desalination has been a method that was chosen by energy rich countries, such as the Gulf countries in the Middle East or especially rich countries like Singapore or et cetera. So for Cyprus, maybe it can be a partial solution, but, we cannot rely on desalination for all the water needs of the island. Plus, even the transfer from Turkey cannot be sufficient for the agricultural needs, because as I said again, the evapotranspiration is extensive. We should definitely utilize the drip irrigation system, or maybe sprinklers not definitely the old style open canal or wild irrigation as we call it. So, as I said there should be a compound, there should be a set of solutions, instead of a magic tool in terms of water equation. And water saving technologies, water saving traditions should also be used. For example, even in countries like Yemen, we have traditions historically, not to dig a well less than close to 500 meters to another house for example, but with the widespread use of motor pumps and the diesel water pumps, people began to break this tradition and now Yemen is fully depleted of groundwater resources. And it is also one of the reasons that Yemen actually entered into this phase of chaos in the country. Of course it was not only the single reason, but water can trigger sometimes bigger questions. There is a risk of securitization of the water issues, in all parts of the world, including Cyprus. So water security or these terms should be, carefully use definitely. But, I mean, there are indices, showing the level of scarcity or water limits of the countries or the water needs of the countries and Cyprus is not on the positive side, I should say, like in almost all parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. So, it would be of best to combine the efforts of the two communities, plus Greece and Turkey as well in order to come together and talk about the solutions, mitigation, not only mitigation, but also adaptation measures, because it is very difficult for a single country or a couple of countries to stop this climate change. It is scientifically proven that, even the Paris Agreement, it is doubtful that it will be enough to stop the climate change as we desire. So there are lots of issues definitely, the carbon print and the water footprint of the island is big actuallyin terms of the tourism sector. The tourism is one of the sectors that consume water enormously, and a hotel, for example, which has 300 beds, usually uses water equal to a town of 10,000 people, so one 300 bed hotel is equal to one 10,000 people town. So we should all think about these issues in combinationand dialogue, dialogue, dialogue.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: So as you well said that water is not a commodity, but it's a heritage. I really like that sentence by the way. That's what we should,

I guess, remember. We still have few minutes left. So if there are more questions here…

Charalambos Tsardanidis: I have a question.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Yes professor.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: A question to Altuğ Günal, dealing with the Cyprus problem. Do you consider as a precondition for some kind of solution of the Cyprus problem, that Greece and Turkey first find an accommodation in order to have a spillover effect benefiting Cyprus?

Altuğ Günal: Well, actually unless Turkey and Greece come together and make a rapprochement, it is impossible to solve the Cyprus issue. I mean, some accept them as the motherlands, some do not, but before Turkey and Greece agree on solving the other problems, especially in the Aegean and now in Eastern Mediterranean, I don't think they would let the Cyprus problem be solved.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Okay. We agree on that. Yes. This is exactly my point.

Altuğ Günal: And that's why the Turkey's army in Cyprus would not be withdrawn before these problems are solved. Because you know, the number of, or the military powers, the navy power of Greece and Turkey is in balance and it is the same for the air force. But if there is a war between Greece and Turkey in the future, which we would never want that for sure, but if that happens, because of the number of islands on the Aegean Sea, Greece will be more advantageous. So until the two sides, I mean Greece and Turkey, agree on solving the problems in the Eastern Mediterranean or the other issues as well, it is impossible to solve the issue in Cyprus too.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Okay. I understand your argument although I do not entirely agree with you, on your point about the advantage Greece has due to the Aegean islands. I think that the Cyprus problem solution is dependent upon the developments of the Greek-Turkish relationship, like it was in the 1960s as well as in other phases of the Cyprus problem.

Altuğ Günal: You're welcome. But I will also remind something, with the Annan Plan, Turkey had accepted to withdraw its army. So if it feels safe enough for the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey may change its mind too.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Not all the troops however.

Altuğ Günal: Almost all of them, almost.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: I mean with the exception of those agreed to stay under the London Zurich Agreements.

Altuğ Günal: Symbolic, which cannot threaten the Greek Cypriots.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Okay. Although the Greek Cypriots during the Crans-Montana talks were insisting on that point very much. But now we are not obliged to enter in these details. The thing is we're talking about the strategy now and think on the analysis we made about the importance of the effect of Greek-Turkish relationship regarding the Cyprus problem is almost the same.

Altuğ Günal: Yes. And, to add regarding the Macedonia issue, I mean, you asked a question about that. Yes, they launched their independence movement towards Ottomans for instance, by claiming that they were Bulgarians. I mean, indeed they were Bulgarian nationalists, later Yugoslav president Tito, helped them to create their own identity, mainly because he didn't want Bulgaria to claim rights over Macedonia and Macedonians in the future.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: So many years have passed since 1945, two, three generations. If you ask a young person in Skopje for example, "Which is your national affiliation", he will say Macedonian, not Bulgarian, not something else. I mean Macedonian, because he feels that belongs to a Macedonian nationalhood.

Altuğ Günal: Yes. And at the time you will remember that the Tito and the Communist Party removed many Bulgarian words from Macedonian, and they built a separate Macedonian church for the same reason.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: The language.

Altuğ Günal: Yes the language. But today Bulgaria still claims rights over Macedonians.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: This is another question.

Altuğ Günal: They want them to change their history books. They want them to formally recognize that their language has Bulgarian roots, et cetera. So they don't forget. And one more thing on identity, Turks from Turkey who immigrated to Cyprus and also the Turkish governments from time to time compel the Turkish Cypriots the Anatolian way of life and conservatism, which is not in harmony with islanders' culture and way of living as well. So I believe this also motivates some Turkish Cypriots to embrace Cypriotism more, that's why their numbers increase.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Yes. There's a reactionary Cypriot identity.

Altuğ Günal: Yes. I think it's reactionary.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: That's what also we found with Dilek Latif actually. Especially young generation feels like that their life is under threat of change. So more secular, more modern, and I guess Effie also has a point about this?

Effie Charalampaki: Regarding this question, I have a question, both to Dr. Tsardanidis and to Dr. Altuğ. I realized that the first name is the last name; I apologize before… because I went by the Greek order…

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Like the opposite.

Altuğ Günal: Doesn't matter.

Effie Charalampaki: Yes, it's the opposite, I realize it now. If the two communities came together and had a referendum and decided that we want Turkey and Greece to stay outside our affairs, and then the European Union was willing to play a more important and more active role in the context of its strategic compass, strategic autonomy strategy that is developing right now, and became really a broker for peace of the island, transcending power politics. Do you think that this wouldn't work still? And Greece and Turkey wouldn't respect the wishes of the two communities? Especially if the European Union became the broker for peace and the guarantor that the two nations will be left outside regardless their own issues in the Eastern Aegean and other issues they have. And we would leave the two communities on the island alone to find a common framework that then would be brought into the attention of Greece and Turkey, Brussels; perhaps, I mean I'm sure the transatlantic security structures and other actors from the international community. You think that this would be a viable framework, a pathway for conflict resolution? Thank you.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: What will be the exact question for the referendum?

Effie Charalampaki: The referendum would be that: We want Greece and Turkey to stay outside our affairs for a certain period of time to try to develop a common framework to talk with each other, and we'll have European Union as a guarantor for this process. I know it sounds utopian, but I just have this question because it's maybe a backward thinking, but we have to move forward, we have to find a way forward. Thank you very much.

Altuğ Günal: Okay, dear Effie, I think it will be hard, but, I can remind you that in 2004 Turkey respected Cypriots will on the referendum. So, it's not impossible, but I would like to also remind that the Turkish political discourse from the 1950s, we can see that Turkey's and Turkey Cypriot security were

frequently mentioned together, not separately. And I can claim that the strategic consideration slightly forced ahead. Let's remember, Denktaş, Alparslan Türkeş, Ahmet Davutoğlu the former prime minister as well, they all said that even if there had been not a single Muslim Turk in Cyprus, it would have been necessary for Turkey to have a Cyprus problem. I think it is not so much different for the Greece as well. Therefore, I don't think until Turkey also agrees, this would be possible.

Effie Charalampaki: Thank you very much for your response. So basically what we have to do is actually find a framework to transcend the security dilemma and, borrowing from Allison's "Thucydides' trap," because this is what you said, it's the perfect example. So, how do we find this framework? I mean, it comes down to this and that's where theory comes in order to create, you know, foreign policy ultimately, we translate it into governance. I know that I remain optimistic, but I appreciate your response very much. I would also like to hear Dr. Tsardanidis' input.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Speaking pragmatically, is there a Greek Cypriot president or politician ready to put such a question to a referendum? They don't even imagine of doing that. This is a question which will never be put in a referendum. On the other hand, if there is an agreement between the two comunities, perhaps yes. Politically speaking, this is my answer; I think this is out of the question. It is impossible. Although in politics nothing is impossible, but for the time being, according to the prevailing political situation in the Greek Cypriot community today, I don't think that there will be even one politician willing to bring such an issue in his political agenda.

Effie Charalampaki: Thank you for your response.

Altuğ Günal: And may I add that the public surveys show that the majority of Turkish Cypriots still wants Turkey to be a guaranteeing power. I mean, they still trust Turkey for their protection. So I believe they wouldn't like any solution without Turkey's protection, but I'm also sure they wouldn't like this much interference in their internal affairs.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Maybe we can also listen Dilek Latif here, because she's actually from North Cyprus as a Turkish Cypriot. So Dilek can you hear us, maybe you can also share some ideas.

Dilek Latif: This is a very good question Effie, but as Charalambos rightly said, I don't think neither the leaders nor the people would say yes to this question. And although Turkish Cypriots would like to be under united Cyprus and be part of European Union, I guess still in terms of security, they would

prefer to have Turkey on their side. So, we can say that, they want to have EU membership, they want to have a solution, but it would be good to have Turkey for security reasons as well.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: What is the motivation here? Is it economic, political, social feelings, what is the motivation here for this connection with Turkey?

Dilek Latif: I would say the past, there has been tension and conflicts and in the mind of ordinary people there is a lot of confusion like United Nations came here, but they couldn't protect us. And you try to explain them like the UN was not supposed to be here to fight against one side. They came here to be a buffer zone and provide humanitarian aid. So, there is no good reason to blame them that they didn't stop thewarfare, at least here, because it wasn't the mission of UN forces. But, with that, the past memories and the traumas that you also mentioned Aslı, I think, people would say in case something goes wrong and there's a kind of clash, again who would come and save Turkish Cypriots, who would come and fight for them. So it would be good to have Turkey on their side. But of course, if you ask any young Turkish Cypriot here, they would tell you, "Yes, of course we want to be part of European Union, we want to be part of the recognized world because T.R.N.C. is not recognized". That's why they are applying to get the EU passports because they cannot travel anywhere with T.R.N.C. passports. And this would give them like good prospects for studying, for traveling and getting better living standards. But, maybe for security, it would be good to keep Turkey so that they can have everything. This is like a very pragmatic answer, not academic one actually.

Altuğ Günal: We have the common history, we have the common ethnicity. So the people, the Turkish Cypriots were the people emigrated from Anatolia during 16th century or 18th century. So it is normal that they would trust the mainland first or above all. And also, I think they really remember that during the 1960s or '50s, or until '74 and no one came to help but Turkey when they were suffering. So they may be still thinking the same. I mean, if someone is going to come for help, it will be Turkey. But the time has changed, we should also remember that. I mean during 1960-70s, the human rights and humanitarian intervention concepts were not strong enough, the sovereignty was more important. If the things happened in 1960s and '70s happens today, results may be different. I mean, the United Nations may react stronger this time. But at that time it was only Turkey who came for help.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: I have a question to Latif. Since 1975, 1974, the first people coming from Anatolia were considered as migrants, whatever they are migrants or settlers, they came to Cyprus, Northern Cyprus. Do you have any indication from your surveys that the younger generation, the people from Anatolia who were born in Cyprus - second generation let's say, or even third generation- have changed, in comparison with the parents, their identity a little bit? Do they consider themselves more as Turkish Cypriots, rather than Turks, or do they consider themselves as Turks?

Dilek Latif: I have students actually, who are children of Turkey settlers, according to the international terms for them. So, their parents came in 1980s and they were born here, they considered it, they said like… There was a young, writer, actually a journalist and writer; he just published a book, a young boy in his mid-twenties, very passionate. He tells hero stories of North Cyprus in his book, which took a lot, you know, it's like very much popular. And he felt, "Oh, I did it because I wanted to show that I am part of this society and I am writing your stories". And he wanted to receive this acceptance because I met him in a conference when he was very openly telling me his feelings, then, in the newspapers, he said that children of a settler from Hatay wrote, published a book and you see how well they are getting integrated with the new generations. Actually, he wanted to have the opposite, like he wanted to have this acceptance, but still this like children of settlers from Hatay. And then when he went to Turkey and he says like I don't feel affiliated with Turkey because I was born in Cyprus. I don't know. I never lived in Turkey and I don't know much, I don't have much connection to Turkey, although probably, they might have some distinct relatives. And he went to Turkey for the representation of his book for book launch. And he was introduced as a Turkish Cypriot author. And he was like having these mixed feelings. And I think the younger generations or Turkish people whose parents migrated after the 1974 War; they feel part of Turkish Cypriot society. They speak with Turkish Cypriot accent, most of them. And they want to be seen as part of this society. So I don't know if that's the answer, Charalambos?

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Yes. Thank you very much. I expected that and I consider it quite normal.

Effie Charalampaki: One last remark, thank you very much. Borrowing from Dr. Altuğ's presentation and all his remarks, of course and Dr. Tsardanidis's responses -of course we all know that the main issue at this point is security, we need to guarantee security for both communities and especially for the Turkish community of the North, because they keep this affiliation with

Turkey, from their security dilemma, they're facing- so, this is an excellent point in favor of the European Union federation for the whole island [I meant a Cypriot federation that will be an EU member-state]. Because, if you had a federation that is in European Union, a full member state, this becomes automatically a normative structure that guarantees security under European Union treaties. Correct? And please correct me if you think I'm wrong. And this way we cannot experience the things we saw in Yugoslavia, because right now we're talking about a different era, a different time where normative structures are created regarding human rights, democracy, the rule of law, according to European Union treaties, and according, of course, to other international institutions, we have a high level of regionalism. The two communities are becoming stakeholders in bigger interests. And could this be automatically a guarantor, a normative structure to guarantee security for both communities and transcend this security dilemma? Thank you. I just had this thought because obviously we're trying to create a formula in order to guarantee security and help the two communities to come together and create a common future. Thank you very much.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: Effie, I'm not arguing that the process of bottom-up is not useful. It's quite useful. The efforts for bringing the two Cypriot communities together in different aspects of their social life should be continued. What I'm arguing is that it is not the key factor for solving the Cyprus problem. It may contribute to a relaxation of tension, of knowing each other, because nowadays the young Greek Cypriots don't know the Turkish Cypriot community as it was the case with their grandfathers especially when they were living in the same villages. The Turkish Cypriots, even they, used to visit Greek churches, Greek Orthodox churches. So they were sharing a lot of things. Today both communities don't share these common values and common experiences. So don't expect that this process is very useful.

Effie Charalampaki: Of course.

Charalambos Tsardanidis: I want to congratulate Aslı for having the initiative and organizing this symposium. Such meetings should be continued at least between the academics in order to to find some common grounds. Of course we have different approaches, but at least we are sharing them and this is very positive.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Dialogue matters.

Effie Charalampaki: Thank you Dr. Tsardanidis, I really appreciate your intervention in my ideas. I just have to emphasize that I'm not a utopian, I'm a visionary, and I look into the future, and that's why you may have realized

from the theory I'm creating, because I have models, I have stuff I am going to publish, and they're very forward-looking. And, also, what you mentioned: that we need to start the process. I didn't mean that we'll say: "Okay, now we're creating a federation and the European Union will be the guarantor." No, it's a very long process, but let's start a process, and let's learn from this process, and let's allow the process to be the emerging factor that will give us to become like an open system. And, from there, have emerging frameworks and go with the flow. We have never done this. That's why I mentioned in my presentation that we always followed deterministic politics. And in situations like this where it's a linear thinking; but in protracted conflicts, we should transcend linear thinking, and indeterminism and free will should guide policy. So let's start the process like this. And especially with young people, bring the young people, you know, with fresh ideas. What is, it was mentioned before about innovation through science communities. This will make both communities shareholders. This is very important because when you are a stakeholder on shared interests, you are willing to transcend sometimes historical traumas and in order to move forward, because the future has higher stakes, you know, you're making a calculation of cos-benefit -we're going back to Gilpin. But, I really appreciate you having me here and allowing me to voice this, you know, very forward-looking ideas. I really thank you all.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you everybody. I really regret to call the symposium off now, because I can see that we are really in the middle of a really good discussion here. Let's hope that we can continue in another organization later. So let me say that actually being able to discuss Cyprus issue from different perspectives has been really productive and fruitful, and obviously we have a long way to walk, but away full of, actually, possibilities, opportunities and chances for, actually, societies. So I hope that we can at least contribute into solutions with our discussion here. Of course, we should also remember to thank to the audience being with us here and asking great questions.So, I would like to give the floor to Siret Hürsoy for concluding the symposium.

Siret Hürsoy: I was watching with a great interest to run ascended and every issue was triggering something new into me. And I was holding myself not to participate in those discussions, and unfortunately we don't have much time. So I kept myself to go on, and I was always thinking of what you're talking and trying to combine the views with my own thoughts and with my own experiences. But what I would like to say just in a couple of sentences is that I really appreciate all thoughts. And I appreciate, also what you have

discussed in the couple of minutes, particularly the thoughts coming from Effie's point of view. But most of these thoughts, Effie, are not something completely new, to be honest, to let you know that those views are directly coming from the Communist Party, from the Southern part of Cyprus.

Effie Charalampaki: Really?

Siret Hürsoy: Yes.

Effie Charalampaki: I had no idea.

Siret Hürsoy: So if you're making a bit research on this, you would see that, the communist party's views are always on these thoughts. And it has been tried several times in the past, after the second, after the end of the Cold War, that the civil societies could make a great effort in bringing the issues and cracking those solid tectonic plates, which was formed on the island of Cyprus. I really understand you that you're trying to create a crack on this tectonic solid ground. And I believe that this needs to be done for resolving the Cyprus conflict. We missed several opportunities in the past, as I mentioned, but what I understand what you say is from Ernst B. Haas and James Rosenau's points of views, is that how the Germany and France came together, but keeping your mind that Germany and France was almost came after the crack of this tectonic place after the Second World War, and one side was forced to it. And secondly, almost these two powers were equal to each other. We don't have this equality on the island. If you leave the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots alone, numerically, the Turkish Cypriots are less than Greek Cypriots and they have always felt the fear. So you don't have this equality to bring them together and to match each other's power. So I always see the Cyprus as a kind of an onion, like you peel one leaf from outside, you see another one, and the Cyprus problem is not so, or the Cyprus is an island just strategically, it's not so less important, not to be left to other powers. So it is so important that unfortunately, always other powers are getting involved in it. We have seen this during the British, Ottoman period of time. Why Ottomans were there? Why British were there? Why now island is divided during the Cold War between the ideological reasons between the Soviet Union and Americans and why now Cyprus cannot be left to the Cypriots? So it is so very important on the Eastern side of the Mediterranean, because just strategically controlling the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus Region, the Suez Canal, the North Africa, still two British sovereign bases are there, you know. So even if you think of that, just leave the islands, just to the Cypriots, then the British are there, you know, and the Communist Party, AKEL,is also always asking for the British to leave the island, just because of what you're saying that leave the islands to the Cypriots.

And, you know, I have many things to tell from each point of view, to discuss more in detail, also theoretically as well to these issues, but the time, unfortunately, that was not enough. And unfortunately I was one of those speakers to get involved all the time into those thoughts, you know. So next time, I promise now, most probably Aslı will also agree, now this meeting, I mean, triggered something that we definitely need the second conference, the second meeting, maybe…

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Yes obviously we have had more to discuss.

Siret Hürsoy: Yes, with more time to discuss as well.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: It just started.

Siret Hürsoy: Yes, with make it a bit bigger maybe it will be a series of discussions based on specific points. So these were all my thoughts and therefore I'm really, really happy to see you and meet you and to get you know, as well. And we will make a bigger community, particularly the community who will include those people, trying to look forward, not into the backward, because we know the backward. We know what happened in the past. What we need is to crack it, as you said, to shake it, to find a way for the future.And, even though utopia or visionary, it doesn't matter. Vision is a vision. Utopia is a utopia. I always look at them in a positive way because without making a research, without exploring it, you don't know whether it will be successful or not. So, that's what I would like to say. So, hopefully we will, again, making another organization to bring you with many issues, including energy, water, oil, natural gas, these ways, energy roads, what can be done on it specifically need theoretical outlookings to the Cyprus problem, as you said, or the view of EU, whether from Charalambos' point of view and Dilek's point of view, the role of the woman, so on the Cyprus, that's another matter, but it needs to be discussed in very much in detail. I mean, there were many thoughts in my mind, as far as when I heard for the first time, I said, I'm a Turkish Cypriot, but I didn't know exactly the role or research on the role of the Cyprus conflict of a woman. So there are many other things that I would like to say on this. And so therefore, we will have another meeting, so I don't want to keep it longer. I am really, really thankful to you all those participants and in the very beginning, Aslı reminded me that there are others who are working behind of the scenes very hard to this organization. So I forgot them and I didn't do it intentionally. So Oktay Dayıoğlu and our new assistant, Nilda Çiçekli was also there. So, both of them contributed a lot for this organization. And I'm also thankful to them. Thank you to all again for being with us and see you in the near future again.

Aslı Ergül Jorgensen: Thank you everybody for these valuable contributions and hope to see you again, in İzmir next time.

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 Ege University, International Relations, Turkey

Effie CHARALAMPAKI

 Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Institute of International Relations, Greece

76

Miranda CHRISTOU

University of Cyprus, Sociology of Education, Cyprus

Altuğ GÜNAL

Ege University, International Relations, Turkey

Dilek LATİF

Near East University, International Relations, TRNC

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